Punishment and Deterrence: A Comparative Study of Tort Liability for Punitive Damages Under No-Fault Compensation Legislation by Love, Jean C.
Santa Clara Law
Santa Clara Law Digital Commons
Faculty Publications Faculty Scholarship
1-1-1982
Punishment and Deterrence: A Comparative Study
of Tort Liability for Punitive Damages Under No-
Fault Compensation Legislation
Jean C. Love
Santa Clara University School of Law, jlove@scu.edu
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.law.scu.edu/facpubs
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Scholarship at Santa Clara Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Faculty Publications by an authorized administrator of Santa Clara Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
sculawlibrarian@gmail.com.
Recommended Citation
16 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 231
U.C. DAVIS LAW REVIEW -: University
Of
alifonia
~Davis
VOLUME 16 WINTER, 1983 NUMBER 2
Punishment and Deterrence: A
Comparative Study of Tort Liability
for Punitive Damages Under No-Fault
Compensation Legislation
BY JEAN C. LOVE
TABLE OF CONTENTS
INTRODUCTION .................................. 232
1. PURE NO-FAULT PLANS .......................... 234
A. New Zealand's Accident Compensation Act ...... . 235
B. United States: Workers' Compensation Legislation 244
1. Punitive Damages in Addition to Workers'
Compensation .......................... 246
2. Intentional Tort or Recklessness Actions for
Punitive Damages in Addition to Workers'
Com pensation ........................... 252
a. Statutory Cause of Action: Oregon, Wash-
ington, and West Virginia ............. 252
b. Judicially Created Cause of Action: Cali-
fornia .............................. 257
3. Intentional Tort or Recklessness Actions for
Punitive Damages in Lieu of Workers' Com-
pensation ............................... 262
a. Statutory Cause of Action .............. 263
b. Judicially Created Cause of Action ..... 267
HeinOnline  -- 16 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 231 1982-1983
University of California, Davis
C. Legislative Options ......................... 273
1. Punitive Damages as a Cumulative Remedy 273
2. Cumulative or Alternative Tort Actions for Pu-
nitive D am ages .......................... 274
II. MODIFIED NO-FAULT PLANS ...................... 276
A. United States: No-Fault Automobile Insurance ... 276
B. Legislative Options .......................... 280
C ONCLUSION .................................... 282
Punishment and Deterrence: A
Comparative Study of Tort Liability
For Punitive Damages Under No-Fault
Compensation Legislation
BY JEAN C. LOVE*
INTRODUCTION
Tort law has traditionally served several functions: compensation, de-
terrence, punishment and vindication.' Although compensation is gen-
erally regarded as the primary purpose of tort liability,2 common law
* Professor of Law, School of Law, University of California, Davis; B.A. 1965, J.D.
1968, University of Wisconsin. This Article is based in part on research undertaken
while the author was a Fulbright-Hays Senior Scholar in residence at Victoria Univer-
sity of Wellington, New Zealand, and at the University of Melbourne, Australia, in
1978. The research was updated in 1982 when the author returned to Victoria Univer-
sity of Wellington under a Research Development Award from the University of Cali-
fornia, Davis.
I am grateful to Professor John Fleming of Boalt Hall, University of California,
Berkeley, for his valuable comments on an earlier draft of this article. I am also in-
debted to my research assistants Wendy Dezzani, Bob Hawn, Stefan Reinke, and
Benna Troup.
I J. FLEMING, THE LAW OF TORTS 1-3 (5th ed. 1977) [hereafter J. FLEMING]; 1 F.
HARPER & F. JAMES, THE LAW OF TORTS §§ 3.6-3.9, 4.7, 5.30, 9.6-9.7 (1956); W.
PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS 1-14 (4th ed. 1971) [hereafter W.
PROSSER].
2 J. FLEMING, note 1 supra, at 2; 2 F. HARPER & F. JAMES, THE LAW OF TORTS §
25.1 (1956).
[Vol. 16:231
HeinOnline  -- 16 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 232 1982-1983
Punitive Damages and No-Fault Legislation
tort actions have never provided reimbursement for every harm done by
one person to another.' Instead, in recognition of tort law's multiple
objectives, the common law has usually conditioned liability upon proof
of fault." Growing dissatisfaction with this system of compensation has
resulted in the enactment of both "pure" and "modified" no-fault stat-
utes.' In the United States, workers' compensation legislation has been
adopted by every jurisdiction.' Additionally, several states have passed
some type of "modified" no-fault plan governing automobile accidents.'
In New Zealand, a comprehensive statute authorizes compensation
whenever a person has sustained "personal injury by accident."8
J. FLEMING, note 1 supra, at 4.
Id. at 4-5; W. PROSSER, note I supra, at 16-19. The requirement that liability be
based on proof of fault was most vigorously enforced in the nineteenth century. Courts
have been more willing to impose strict liability in the twentieth century. Id. at 17-19.
, J. FLEMING, note 1 supra, at 12-13. "Pure" no-fault statutes completely abrogate
tort liability and create an alternative mechanism for compensating accident victims.
"Modified" no-fault statutes retain tort liability in the more serious cases and create a
substitute to tort liability only for relatively minor claims.
1 A. LARSON, THE LAW OF WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION § 5.30 (1978); Epstein,
The Historical Origins and Economic Structure of Workers' Compensation Law, 16
GA. L. REV. 775 (1982); Larson, The Nature and Origins of Workmen's Compensa-
tion, 37 CORNELL L.Q. 206 (1952) [hereafter Larson]. Workers' compensation is a
"pure" no-fault plan because the benefits awarded are a complete substitute for the
compensatory damages that would otherwise be recoverable in a negligence action
against the employer. For a discussion of workers' compensation legislation in other
countries, see Fleming, Tort Liability for Work Injury, in 15 INTERNATIONAL ENCY-
CLOPEDIA OF COMPARATIVE LAW 9-1 to 9-46 (1975).
' 1 I. SCHERMER, AUTOMOBILE LIABILITY INSURANCE § 1.01 (2d ed. 1981) [hereaf-
ter I. SCHERMER]; Note, No-Fault Automobile Insurance: An Evaluative Survey, 30
RUTGERS L. REV. 909, 910-32 (1977). There are two types of no-fault plans for auto-
mobile accidents in the United States: "add-on" and "modified" plans. Id. at 923-31.
"Add-on" plans supplement standard liability policies with first-party coverage for bod-
ily injury and will not be considered in this article because they have no impact on tort
liability. "Modified" plans provide compensation for economic loss and preclude tort
actions for pain and suffering unless the plaintiff crosses a monetary or verbal "thresh-
old" which is designed to ensure that the plaintiff has sustained substantial harm.
"Modified no-fault" plans derive from the pioneering proposal advanced by Professors
Keeton and O'Connell in 1965. R. KEETON & J. O'CONNELL, BASIC PROTECTION FOR
THE TRAFFIC VICTIM: A BLUEPRINT FOR REFORMING AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE
(1965).
a Accident Compensation Act of 1972, [1975] 2 N.Z. Stat. 1409. See generally M.
BERKOWITZ, ECONOMICS OF WORK ACCIDENTS IN NEW ZEALAND (1979); A. BLAIR,
ACCIDENT COMPENSATION IN NEW ZEALAND (1978) [hereafter A. BLAIR]; T. ISON,
ACCIDENT COMPENSATION: A COMMENTARY ON THE NEW ZEALAND SCHEME (1980)
[hereafter T. ISON]; G. PALMER, COMPENSATION FOR INCAPACITY: A STUDY OF LAW
AND SOCIAL CHANGE IN NEW ZEALAND AND AUSTRALIA (1979) [hereafter G.
19831
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These types of no-fault plans have several common features. First,
compensation may be obtained without proof of fault. Second, the
amount of compensation available uader no-fault statutes is less than
that recoverable at common law. And finally, no-fault benefits are a
complete or partial substitute for tort recovery.
When no-fault plans were enacted, the legislators focused on the in-
adequacy of tort law in performing its compensatory function.' The
primary objective was to replace negligence liability with a swift, cer-
tain method of no-fault compensation.' However, the language used to
create a substitute remedy was often so broad that it could be construed
to abolish even intentional and recklessness tort actions." This Article
explores whether no-fault compensation legislation should be inter-
preted to abrogate all tort liability, or whether it should be construed
more narrowly to preserve tort actions and remedies designed to pro-
mote punishment and deterrence. The Article first examines cases from
both the United States and New Zealand, and then suggests various
options for drafting no-fault compensation legislation which would pre-
serve the punitive and deterrent functions of tort law.
I. PURE No-FAULT PLANS
Pure no-fault legislation typically provides benefits for personal in-
jury and abrogates compensatory tort damages for such harm, at least
in negligence actions." This section considers whether pure no-fault
legislation also bars the recovery of exemplary damages, which have
traditionally served a punitive and deterrent function in actions for per-
PALMER]; Henderson, Jr., The New Zealand Accident Compensation Reform, 48 U.
CHI. L. REV. 781 (1981).
' See generally R. KEETON & J. O'CONNELL, BASIC PROTECTION FOR THE TRAFFIC
VICTIM: A BLUEPRINT FOR REFORMING AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE 11-75 (1965); G.
PALMER, note 8 supra, at 23-32; Larson, note 6 supra, at 209-11.
10 R. KEETON & J. O'CONNELL, BASIC PROTECTION FOR THE TRAFFIC VICTIM: A
BLUEPRINT FOR REFORMING AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE 6-10 (1965); G. PALMER, note
8 supra, at 214-43; Larson, note 6 supra, at 206.
1 For example, prior to 1983, the California workers' compensation statute provided
that it was "the exclusive remedy for injury or death of an employee against the em-
ployer. . . . " CAL. LAB. CODE § 3601 (West Supp. 1982), amended by Act of Sept.
10, 1982, ch. 922, § 5, 1982 Cal. Legis. Serv. 4948, 4949 (West). Similarly, the New
Zealand Accident Compensation Act states: "[W]here any person suffers personal in-
jury by accident in New Zealand . . ., no proceedings for damages arising directly or
indirectly out of the injury ... shall be brought in any Court in New Zealand inde-
pendently of this Act .... " Accident Compensation Act of 1972, § 5(1), [1975] 2
N.Z. Stat. 1409.
2 See statutes quoted in note 11 supra.
[Vol. 16:231
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sonal injury. The section reviews the cases construing the New Zealand
Accident Compensation Act, and then examines the various types of
workers' compensation statutes in the United States.
A. New Zealand's Accident Compensation Act
New Zealand's accident compensation plan is comprehensive. It cov-
ers not only work-related injuries, but extends to any "personal injury
by accident."13 Administered by the Accident Compensation Corpora-
tion,"4 the plan is funded by levies on employers and motor vehicles as
well as by general tax revenues. 5 An injured client receives 1) compen-
sation for medical expenses, rehabilitation treatment, and pecuniary
losses not related to earnings; 2) earnings-related compensation (eighty
percent of pre-accident earnings up to a maximum ceiling); 3) a lump
sum benefit for permanent loss or impairment of bodily function (up to
$7000); and 4) a lump sum benefit for such nonphysical harm as pain
and suffering and loss of amenities (up to $10,000).16 The stated pur-
poses of this legislation are to provide compensation to all accident vic-
tims and to promote safety and rehabilitation. 7
The Act clearly specifies that it is a substitute remedy for compensa-
tory tort damages:
[W]here any person suffers personal injury by accident in New Zealand or
dies as a result of personal injury so suffered, . . . no proceedings for
damages arising directly or. indirectly out of the injury or death shall be
brought in any Court in New Zealand independently of this Act .... Is
13 Accident Compensation Act of 1972, § 5(1), [1975] 2 N.Z. Stat. 1409.
', Accident Compensation Amendment Act of 1980, § 2, [1980] 2 N.Z. Stat. 726.
1' T. ISON, note 8 supra, at 14.
26 Accident Compensation Act of 1972, §§ 107-21, [1975] 2 N.Z. Stat. 1409; A.
BLAIR, note 8 supra, at 2; T. ISON, note 8 supra, at 15. Compensation is also payable
to dependents in the event of death. Accident Compensation Act of 1972, §§ 122-25,
[1975] 2 N.Z. Stat. 1409.
7 Accident Compensation Act of 1972, § 4, 1975] 2 N.Z. Stat. 1409. The Act
evolved from a report by a Royal Commission headed by Mr. Justice Woodhouse. G.
PALMER, note 8 supra, at 63-130. The Royal Commission stated five guidelines for
implementing an accident compensation scheme:
a) community responsibility in respect of all persons suffering injury by accident;
b) comprehensive entitlement;
c) rehabilitation with or in substitution for monetary compensation;
d) realistic compensation for the whole .period of incapacity and with recognition for
loss resulting from permanent bodily impairment;
e) administrative efficiency.
A. BLAIR, note 8 supra, at 4.
Accident Compensation Act of 1972, § 5(1), [1975] 2 N.Z. Stat. 1409. The Acci-
1983]
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It also may appear that the Act clearly prohibits the recovery of puni-
tive damages as "damages" that arise "indirectly out of an injury or
death." In fact, however, the New Zealand courts were sharply divided
during the past five years on the question of whether the Act abolishes
actions for punitive damages in cases of personal injury by accident."
Most lower courts held that punitive damages are not recoverable.2"
In Donselaar v. Donselaar,2' one brother hit another with a hammer.
The plaintiff alleged assault and battery and prayed for an injunction
and $5000 in exemplary or punitive damages.22 The trial court held
that the plaintiff could proceed with the claim for injunctive relief, as
the Act abolishes neither intentional tort causes of action nor the rem-
edy of injunctive relief."3 However, the trial judge dismissed the prayer
for exemplary or punitive damages," taking the position that the
dent Compensation Corporation has exclusive jurisdiction to determine whether a per-
son has coverage under the Act (i.e., whether there has been a "personal injury by
accident"). Id. § 5(5); L v. M, [1979] 2 N.Z.L.R. 519.
" See text accompanying notes 20-40 infra. See generally G. PALMER, note 8 supra,
at 274-76; Bullock, Exemplary Damages and the Accident Compensation Act, [1982]
N.Z.L.J. 26; Bullock, Exemplary Damages and the Accident Compensation Act 1972,
[1980] N.Z.L.J. 215; Collins, Proceedings for Punitive Damages in the Regime of Ac-
cident Compensation, [19781 N.Z.L.J. 158; McInnes, Punishing the Words of Section
5(1): The Other School of Thought Replies, [1979] N.Z.L.J. 8; Vennell, The Scope of
National No-Fault Accident Compensation in Australia and New Zealand, [1975]
AUSTL. L.J. 22; Vennell, Some Kiwi Kite-Flying, (1975] N.Z.L.J. 254; Willy, The
Accident Compensation Act and Recovery for Losses Arising from Personal Injury and
Death by Accident, 6 N.Z.U.L. REV. 250 (1975).
20 E.g., Stowers v. City of Auckland, No. A. 1064/77 (N.Z.S.C. Auckland, May 2,
1979); Betteridge v. McKenzie, No. A. 103/77 (N.Z.S.C. Wellington, Dec. 7, 1978);
Koolman v. Attorney-General, No. A. 519/76 (N.Z.S.C. Wellington, Oct. 3, 1977);
Donselaar v. Donselaar, No. A. 454/76 (N.Z.S.C. Wellington, July 28, 1977), afl'd on
other grounds, No. C.A. 145/77 (N.Z. Ct. App. Mar. 19, 1982) (copies of all slip
opinions on file at U.C. Davis Law Review office).
21 No. A. 454/76 (N.Z.S.C. Wellington, July 28, 1977), afl'd on other grounds, No.
C.A. 145/77 (N.Z. Ct. App. Mar. 19, 1982) (copy on file at U.C. Davis Law Review
office).
22 Id., slip op. at 1.
23 Id. at 3. The Act explicitly abolishes only two causes of action: the action for loss
of services and the action for loss of consortium. Accident Compensation Act of 1972, §
5(2), [1975] 2 N.Z. Stat. 1409. All other tort actions remain in existence, and the Act
bars merely the remedy of "damages arising directly or indirectly out of the injury or
death" caused by accident. Id. § 5(1). Therefore, court proceedings to enjoin an inten-
tional tort may still be brought even though the plaintiff has sustained personal injury
by accident.
24 Donselaar v. Donselaar, No. A. 454/76, slip op. at 3 (N.Z.S.C. Wellington, July
28, 1977), al'd on other grounds, No. C.A. 145/77 (N.Z. Ct. App. Mar. 19, 1982)
(copy on file at U.C. Davis Law Review office).
236 [Vol. 16:231
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phrase "damages arising directly or indirectly out of the injury" relates
to "both branches of damages, that is, compensatory and exemplary.""5
In three other cases denying exemplary or punitive damages, private
citizens brought assault and battery actions against police officers.2" The
most carefully reasoned of these three cases is Stowers v. City of Auck-
land.27 In Stowers, the plaintiff claimed that while he was waiting to be
tested for intoxication, a police officer struck him. The plaintiff sought
$15,000 in punitive damages for the "oppressive, capricious, high-
handed, arbitrary and improper use of the defendant's authority and
also as a deterrent against similar conduct by the employees of the de-
fendant." '28 The court acknowledged the value of punitive damages "in
times of increasing bureaucratic intervention," recognizing that such
damages "may well be the most effective avenue of redress available to
a citizen for whose rights some branch of government, central or local,
has shown contumacious disregard."29
Nevertheless, the court believed that the legislature clearly intended
to abolish punitive damages in cases of personal injury by accident. The
court observed that the Act originally had provided: "No action shall lie
for damages in respect of injury or death" caused by accident.3 0 The
court suggested that, under this language, punitive damages might have
been recoverable, as the statute barred only "damages referrable to the
injury, which must accordingly be compensatory in nature."'" Since pu-
nitive damages are not awarded to compensate the victim's injuries, but
rather to punish the wrongdoer, they might not have been affected by
the original Act." But because the legislature amended the Act in 1974
" Id., slip op., at 2.
26 Stowers v. City of Auckland, No. A. 1064/77 (N.Z.S.C. Auckland, May 2, 1979);
Betteridge v. McKenzie, No. A. 103/77 (N.Z.S.C. Wellington, Dec. 7, 1978); Koolman
v. Attorney-General, No. A. 519/76 (N.Z.S.C. Wellington, Oct. 3, 1977) (copies on file
at U.C. Davis Law Review office).
" No. A. 1064/77 (N.Z.S.C. Auckland, May 2, 1979) (copy on file at U.C. Davis
Law Review office).
Id., slip op. at 2.
29 Id. at 13. Judge McMullin recognized criminal prosecution as an alternative rem-
edy, but said that it would often be difficult "to identify with sufficient particularity, for
the purpose of a criminal prosecution, the individual persons responsible." Id. at 14.
'0 Id. at 16-17. For a comparison of the language of the Act as originally passed and
as amended in 1974, see Collins, Proceedings for Punitive Damages in the Regime of
Accident Compensation, [1978] N.Z.L.J. 158, 163.
" Stowers v. City of Auckland, No. A. 1064/77, slip op. at 17 (N.Z.S.C. Auckland,
May 2, 1979) (copy on file at U.C. Davis Law Review office).
" See generally Collins, Proceedings for Punitive Damages in the Regime of Acci-
dent Compensation, [1978] N.Z.L.J. 158, 164-66.
19831
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to prohibit "proceedings for damages arising directly or indirectly out
of the injury or death," the court believed that the legislature had un-
equivocally expressed an intent to abolish all damages flowing from
personal injury by accident." Unlike the language of the original Act,
which had characterized the nature of the prohibited damages, the
amended language seemed to focus on their cause."' The court observed
that punitive damages cannot be awarded without proof of causation by
tortious conduct." Since the tortious conduct in Stowers was the inten-
tional infliction of physical injury, 6 the court concluded that the plain-
tiff's claim for punitive damages "arose directly or indirectly out of the
injury," and dismissed the complaint."
Although the majority of trial court judges were convinced that the
amended Act prohibited claims for punitive damages, one lower court
judge advanced a contrary interpretation. In Howse v. Attorney Gen-
eral,38 the court held that a plaintiff who alleged an assault and battery
by a police officer could claim punitive damages despite the 1974
amendment because punitive damages "arise . . . from the acts done
contrary to law and not from the harm to the plaintiff caused by such
acts."
In 1982, the Court of Appeal of New Zealand resolved the split of
trial court authority by adopting the Howse court's interpretation of
the Accident Compensation Act. 0 The vehicle for the Court of Appeal's
pronouncement was an appeal from the trial court's judgment in Don-
selaar.'" The appellate opinion contains a complete statement of the
" Stowers v. City of Auckland, No. A. 1064/77, slip op. at 17-18 (N.Z.S.C. Auck-
land, May 2, 1979) (copy on file at U.C. Davis Law Review office).
'4 Id. at 17.
11 Id. at 18.
3I Id.
3, Id. at 20.
In Betteridge v. McKenzie, No. A. 103/77 (N.Z.S.C. Wellington, Dec. 7, 1978)
(copy on file at U.C. Davis Law Review office), an action by two racetrack patrons
against a racecourse inspector and several police officers for assault and battery, the
court advanced an alternative rationale for dismissing an exemplary damages com-
plaint. It refused to believe that the legislature could have intended to preserve the
highly controversial punitive damages remedy as the "only form of damages available
in personal injury claims." Id. at 6.
" No. A. 132/75 (N.Z.S.C. Palmerston North, Oct. 19, 1977) (copy on file at U.C.
Davis Law Review office).
" Id., slip op. at 13 (emphasis added).
" Donselaar v. Donselaar, No. C.A. 145/77 (N.Z. Ct. App. Mar. 19, 1982) (copy
on file at U.C. Davis Law Review office).
" See text accompanying notes 21-25 supra.
[Vol. 16:231
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facts. The evidence showed a long feud between the plaintiff (John)
and the defendant (Andries), who were brothers. 2 They had entered
into a consent judgment, stipulating that John's lease to a particular
piece of property had expired and that Andries was in lawful posses-
sion of the premises."' Despite this consent decree, John trespassed
upon Andries' property." In response, Andries attacked John with a
hammer.'" John then sued Andries for assault and battery."
The first issue facing the Court of Appeal was whether the Act ap-
plied; that is, whether the plaintiff had suffered "personal injury by
accident."" Since the plaintiff alleged an intentional tort, the Court
considered the argument that the injury did not occur "by accident.""
The Court rejected this argument, however, and followed the well-es-
tablished precedents construing workers' compensation legislation in
Great Britain and New Zealand. Workers' compensation legislation
typically provides the exclusive remedy for "injury by accident" arising
out of and in the course of employment."0 In Tim Joint District School
Board of Management v. Kelly,"' workers' compensation death benefits
were awarded for the premeditated killing of a teacher by his students
on the theory that the word "accident" is to be interpreted from the
worker's point of view." The Kelly court observed that "what occurs to
the workman may from his point of view be plainly an accident al-
though some mischievous person may have designedly caused the occur-
42 Donselaar v. Donselaar, No. C.A. 145/77, slip op. by Cooke, J. at 26 (N.Z. Ct.
App. Mar. 19, 1982) (copy on file at U.C. Davis Law Review office).
4 Id. at 2.
44 Id.
," Id. at 3, 26.
46 Id. at 3.
" Accident Compensation Act of 1972, § 5(1), [1975] 2 N.Z. Stat. 1409.
The Act gives the Accident Compensation Corporation exclusive jurisdiction to deter-
mine, as an issue of fact, whether the plaintiff has suffered personal injury by accident.
Id. § 5(5); L v. M, [1979] 2 N.Z.L.R. 519. In Donselaar, the Court was determining,
as a matter of law, whether intentional tort actions causing personal injury are covered
by the Act.
4 The plaintiff in G v. Auckland Hosp. Bd., [1976] 1 N.Z.L.R. 638, had advanced
this argument to the supreme court in Auckland, which rejected it. The Court of Ap-
peal in Donselaar approved the Auckland court's decision for the reasons discussed in
the text accompanying notes 49-56 infra.
' Donselaar v. Donselaar, No. C.A. 145/77, slip op. by Cooke, J. at 17-18 (N.Z.
Ct. App. Mar. 19, 1982) (copy on file at U.C. Davis Law Review office).
1° J. FLEMING, note I siipra, at 494.
s 1914 A.C. 667.
Id. at 679-82, 708-09.
19831
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rence."53 Similarly, the Donselaar court held that the existence of an
accident should be examined from the victim's point of view. 4 The
Court refused to consider whether the defendant was an intentional,
reckless, or negligent wrongdoer, for that is "the description of the ac-
tor, and not a description of what the victim suffered."5 Thus, even
though Andries might have deliberately attacked John, the Court found
that John suffered "personal injury by accident" because the hammer
blow was quite unexpected from John's point of view. 6
The second issue before the Court was whether the Accident Com-
pensation Act barred the plaintiff's claim as one for "damages arising
directly or indirectly out of the injury."'" The Court examined the Brit-
ish distinction between "exemplary" and "aggravated" damages, '
which the Court had recognized as part of the law of New Zealand in
Taylor v. Beere,59 a defamation case decided the same day as Donse-
laar. Aggravated damages are awarded when the plaintiff's injury is
aggravated by the manner in which the defendant acted,6° and may in-
clude sums for loss of reputation, injured feelings, outraged morality,
and indignation. Punitive damages, in contrast, are awarded "as a
punishment and a deterrent, to show that tortious conduct does not
pay."6 The Donselaar court concluded that the Act barred aggravated
damages because they are compensatory in nature.6 3 The Court then
held that the plaintiff was precluded from recovering damages because,
although he had prayed for exemplary damages,6 ' he had submitted
proof of nothing more than aggravated damages for physical injury and
" Id. at 708.
Donselaar v. Donselaar, No. C.A. 145/77, slip op. by Cooke, J. at 18 (N.Z. Ct.
App. Mar. 19, 1982) (copy on file at U.C. Davis Law Review office).
" G v. Auckland Hosp. Bd., [1976] 1 N.Z.L.R. 638, 641.
56 Donselaar v. Donselaar, No. C.A. 145/77, slip op. by Cooke, J. at 18 (N.Z. Ct.
App. Mar. 19, 1982) (copy on file at U.C. Davis Law Review office).
, Accident Compensation Act of 1972, § 5(1), [1975] 2 N.Z. Stat. 1409.
" See Rookes v. Barnard, 1964 A.C. 1129, 1221.
19 No. C.A. 38/80, slip op. by Somers, J. at 8 (N.Z. Ct. App. Mar. 19, 1982) (copy
on file at U.C. Davis Law Review office).
60 Id.
61 Id.
62 Id.
63 Donselaar v. Donselaar, No. C.A. 145/77, slip op. by Cooke, J. at 24-25 (N.Z.
Ct. App. Mar. 19, 1982) (copy on file at U.C. Davis Law Review office).
64 The complaint alleged that, as a result of the hammer blow, the plaintiff had
suffered "substantial indignity, mental suffering, disgrace and humiliation," and prayed
for "exemplary or punitive" damages in the amount of $5000. Id. at 3.
[Vol. 16:231240
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hurt feelings."5 The Court of Appeal thus affirmed the lower court's
decision on different grounds. The lower court had treated the plain-
tiff's claims as one for exemplary or punitive damages, and took the
position that the Act barred such damages."" The Court of Appeal,
however, reclassified the damages as "aggravated damages," and held
that they were a form of compensatory damages precluded by the Act. 7
As an alternative holding, two judges indicated that even proven exem-
plary damages would not have been recoverable, because there was evi-
dence of "provocation" and "fraternal wrangling." '68
The ratio decidendi in Donselaar made it unnecessary to determine
whether the Act barred the alleged punitive damages. The Court recog-
nized, however, that the parties had briefed and argued this point, that
the issue presented a pure question of law, and that the lower courts
had expressed divergent points of view upon the matter.69 Therefore, in
dictum, the Court considered whether punitive damages arise directly
or indirectly from personal injury by accident. The Court began by
candidly acknowledging that the statute could be construed to bar puni-
tive damages. Although punitive damages are not "given for the in-
jury," they are awarded "because the plaintiff has been the victim of
the conduct regarded by the Court as reprehensible . "..."70 Neverthe-
less, the Court believed that the legislature did not intend to bar puni-
tive damages when it passed the Act:
The "mischief" which the Accident Compensation Act set out to remedy
must have been primarily the uneven and inadequate scope of common
law negligence actions as a means of securing compensation for personal
injury in modern society. There is no reason to suppose that any suggested
deficiency in the common law remedies for intentional wrongs was a real
source of concern."
Id. at 26. Judge Somers acknowledged the difficulty of proving punitive or exem-
plary damages in cases of physical injury by accident: "Indeed without some additional
feature as for example an abuse of power or the invasion of other rights of the plaintiff,
it is not easy to envisage a case of personal injury which would not have been met by
compensatory or aggravated compensatory damages . . . ." Id., slip op. by Somers, J.
at 14 (N.Z. Ct. App. Mar. 19, 1982) (copy on file at U.C. Davis Law Review office).
66 See text accompanying notes 21-25 supra.
6 Donselaar v. Donselaar, No. C.A. 145/77, slip op. by Cooke, J. at 24-27; slip op.
by Richardson, J. at 12; slip op. by Somers, J. at 14 (N.Z. Ct. App. Mar. 19, 1982)
(copies of all slip opinions on file at U.C. Davis Law Review office).
6" Id., slip op. by Cooke, J. at 26-27; slip op. by Richardson, J. at 12.
6" Id., slip op. by Somers, J. at 3.
70 Id., slip op. by Cooke, J. at 21.
Id. at 18. See generally G. PALMER, note 8 supra, at 271-78.
The Court also observed that the long title of the Accident Compensation Act sug-
gested that its sole purpose was to provide compensation, not to replace punitive dam-
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Furthermore, the Court believed that recognizing punitive damages
as an independent remedy would serve the public interest." The Court
observed that New Zealand's society "has become more vocal, factional
and discordant," with a "scepticism about established institutions.""'
Allegations of misuse of power by the police and other authorities have
been increasingly common.7 ' For these reasons, the Court felt a need
for effective sanctions against the "irresponsible, malicious or oppres-
sive use of power"7 5 as well as a punitive remedy for the "commonplace
types of trespass or assault . . . which touch the life of ordinary men
and women. 7 6 Having examined both the legislature's intent and the
policy considerations, the Court returned to the language of the Act,
concluding that punitive damages do not "arise directly or indirectly
out of injury or death" because they do not arise out of the harm to the
plaintiff," but out of the outrageous nature of the defendant's conduct.78
The Court then discussed the practical problems raised by its deci-
sion to recognize punitive damages as an independent remedy outside
the Act. First, it had to determine the scope of punitive damages.79 The
ages. Donselaar v. Donselaar, No. C.A. 145/177, slip op. by Cooke, J. at 6, 18 (N.Z.
Ct. App. Mar. 19, 1982) (copy on file at U.C. Davis Law Review office).
,2 Donselaar v. Donselaar, No. C.A. 145/77, slip op. by Cooke, J. at 18 (N.Z. Ct.
App. Mar. 19, 1982) (copy on file at U.C. Davis Law Review office).
1, Id. at 23.
I1 d. at 24.
11 Id. at 23.
76 Id.
In Taylor v. Beere, No. C.A. 38/80, slip op. by Richardson, J. at 7-9 (N.Z. Ct.
App. Mar. 19, 1982) (copy on file at U.C. Davis Law Review office), Justice Richard-
son recognized that criminal law penalties provide an alternative sanction, yet con-
cluded that punitive damages should be recognized because criminal sanctions are not
always available (e.g., in defamation actions) and, when they are, it is dangerous to rely
upon them as the exclusive vehicle of social control. He also noted that the legislature
had explicitly sanctioned the coexistence of penal and compensatory remedies by enact-
ing statutes that permit judges to allocate a portion of a monetary fine to the victim of
the crime. Id. at 8.
" Donselaar v. Donselaar, No. C.A. 145/77, slip op. by Richardson, J. at 5 (N.Z.
Ct. App. Mar. 19, 1982) (copy on file at U.C. Davis Law Review office).
" Id. The Court pointed out that if the legislature were dissatisfied with the Court's
decision, it could amend the Act to restrict or preclude the recovery of punitive dam-
ages. Id., slip op. by Cooke, J. at 25.
" The scope of punitive damages had been identified as an issue, but left unresolved,
in several prior Court of Appeal cases. Huljich v. Hall, [1973 2 N.Z.L.R. 279; News
Media Ownership v. Finlay, [1970] N.Z.L.R. 1089; Truth (N.Z.) Ltd. v. Bowles,
[19661 N.Z.L.R. 303. The lower courts had also discussed the question. A. v. B, [1974]
1 N.Z.L.R. 673 (S.C.); Carrington v. Attorney-General and Murray, [1972] N.Z.L.R.
1106 (S.C.); Fogg v. McKnight, [1968] N.Z.L.R. 330 (S.C.).
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Court discussed this issue in the defamation case, Taylor v. Beere.8 ° In
Taylor, the Court acknowledged that the House of Lords had severely
limited the scope of the punitive remedy in Great Britain.8' Specifically,
the right to recover punitive damages in England is now restricted to 1)
cases of oppressive, arbitrary or unconstitutional action by servants or
agents of the government; 2) cases in which the defendant's conduct is
in contumelious disregard of another's rights in order to obtain some
advantage which would outweigh any compensatory damages likely to
be obtained by the victim; and 3) cases in which exemplary damages
are permitted by statute.82 But the Taylor court also recognized that in
Australian Consolidated Press Ltd. v. Uren,8 3 the Privy Council had
permitted Australia to ignore the House of Lords' restrictions and to
continue developing its own, broader rules governing the scope of the
punitive damages remedy. Following the Australian lead, the Taylor
court rejected the British restrictions ' and held that punitive damages
are recoverable in New Zealand whenever the conduct of the defendant
"merits punishment" because it is "wanton, as where it discloses fraud,
malice, violence, cruelty, insolence or the like"; that is, when the defen-
dant "acts in contumelious disregard of the plaintiff's rights."85
Another practical problem -facing the Donselaar Court was whether
punitive damages could be awarded in the absence of compensatory
damages. It reviewed English and American cases8" and concluded
there was precedent for awarding punitive damages solely on the basis
of nominal damages.87 Alternatively, the Court held that if proof of ac-
tual harm were necessary, the plaintiff could submit evidence of the loss
covered by the Accident Compensation Act.88 As for the difficulty in
assessing the amount of punitive damages in the absence of proof of
so No. C.A. 38/80 (N.Z. Ct. App. Mar. 19, 1982) (copy on file at U.C. Davis Law
Review office).
81 Id., slip op. by Richardson, J. at 1, citing Cassell & Co. v. Broome, 1972 A.C.
1027; Rookes v. Barnard, 1964 A.C. 1129.
82 Taylor v. Beere, No. C.A. 38/80, slip op. by Somers, J. at 2-3 (N.Z. Ct. App.
Mar. 19, 1982) (copy on file at U.C. Davis Law Review office), citing Cassell & Co. v.
Broome, 1972 A.C. 1027; Rookes v. Barnard, 1964 A.C. 1129.(3 11969] 1 A.C. 590. For a discussion of this case, see H. LUNTZ, ASSESSMENT OF
DAMAGES FOR PERSONAL INJURY AND DEATH §§ 1.216, 1.803-1.805 (1974).
84 Taylor v. Beere, No. C.A. 38/80, slip op. by Cooke, J. at 10-15 (N.Z. Ct. App.
Mar. 19, 1982) (copy on file at U.C. Davis Law Review office).
Id., slip op. by Somers, J. at 2.
Donselaar v. Donselaar, No. C.A. 145/77, slip op. by Richardson, J. at 7-11
(N.Z. Ct. App. Mar. 19, 1982) (copy on file at U.C. Davis Law Review office).
Id. at 11.
8 Id.
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compensatory damages," one judge suggested that trial judges deter-
mine whether the circumstances as a whole merit punishment and, if
so, what sum should be awarded to achieve that end, taking into ac-
count the means of the parties."'
In summary, the drafters of the New Zealand Accident Compensa-
tion Act probably never considered whether the Act bars punitive dam-
ages. They could have addressed the question by indicating whether the
phrase "damages arising directly or indirectly out of the injury or
death" was explicitly intended to encompass punitive damages. 1 Faced
with an ambiguous statute, the Court of Appeal in Donselaar decided
to recognize punitive damages as an independent remedy outside the
Act. Although the Court was especially concerned about preserving an
effective remedy that would enable private citizens to punish and deter
oppressive, arbitrary or irresponsible conduct by public officials, it did
not restrict the availability of punitive damages to such circumstances.
Instead, it authorized the remedy against any defendant who acts in
contumelious disregard of the plaintiff's rights.
B. United States: Workers' Compensation Legislation
This article has examined the availability of punitive damages as an
independent remedy outside the New Zealand Accident Compensation
Act, and will now compare the availability of punitive damages under
workers' compensation legislation in the United States. Workers' com-
pensation legislation is a form of social insurance that shifts the cost of
industrial injuries from the worker to the industry and ultimately to the
consuming public.2 Benefits are typically awarded for an "accidental
injury or death arising out of and in the course of employment."9 The
worker receives compensation for medical expenses and rehabilitation
costs and a subsistence allowance that partially covers wage losses. 4
Workers' compensation is often described as the legislative embodi-
ment of a compromise between employers and employees.9 Workers
" Id., slip op. by Cooke, J. at 21-23.
" Id., slip op. by Somers, J. at 13.
" When a comprehensive accident compensation bill was drafted in Australia, the
term "damages" was explicitly defined to exclude "punitive or exemplary damages,"
thereby making it possible to bring tort actions for punitive damages outside the scope
of the proposed legislation. G. PALMER, note 8 supra, at 286.
92 J. FLEMING, note I supra, at 495-96; 1 A. LARSON, THE LAW OF WORKMEN'S
COMPENSATION § 1.10 (1978).
' I A. LARSON, THE LAW OF WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION § 1.10 (1978).
" J. FLEMING, note I supra, at 494-95.
" Mauch v. Stanley Structures, Inc., 641 P.2d 1247, 1249 (Wyo. 1982).
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have relinquished their common law tort remedies, at least for negli-
gence, in exchange for more limited benefits that are paid swiftly, effi-
ciently, and without proof of fault. 6 Employers have given up their
common law defenses in exchange for protection from unlimited liabil-
ity."7 Most legislatures have memorialized this compromise in "exclu-
sive remedy" provisions,"8 which typically provide that the availability
of workers' compensation "excludes all other rights and remedies of the
employee against the employer in an action at common law.""'
The United States' exclusive remedy statutes are very broad. The
above provision bars all rights, including entire causes of action, and all
remedies. The provisions are uniformly construed to bar the recovery of
compensatory damages in negligence actions against employers.10' The
question is whether they also preclude punitive awards in intentional
tort and recklessness actions. Several jurisdictions hold that their exclu-
sive remedy statutes give blanket immunity to the employer against all
Blankenship v. Cincinnati Milacron Chems., Inc., 69 Ohio St. 2d 608, 433
N.E.2d 572, 577 (1982).
9 Id.
" ALA. CODE § 25-5-53 (1975); ALASKA STAT. § 23.30.055 (1972); ARK. STAT.
ANN. § 81-1304 (Supp. 1981); CAL. LAB. CODE § 3602 (West Supp. 1983); COLO.
REV. STAT. § 8-42-102 (Supp. 1981); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 31-284(a) (West
1972); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 19, § 2304 (1979); FLA.. STAT. ANN. § 440.11 (West
1981); GA. CODE ANN. § 114-103 (Supp. 1982); HAWAII REV. STAT. § 386-5 (1976);
ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 48, § 138.5 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1982); IND. CODE ANN. § 22-3-2-
6 (Burns 1974); IOWA CODE ANN. § 85.20 (West Supp. 1982); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 44-
501 (1981); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 39, § 28*(1978); MICH. STAT. ANN. § 17.237
(131) (Callaghan 1982); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 176.031 (West 1966); Miss. CODE ANN.
§ 71-3-9 (1972); MO. ANN. STAT. § 287.120 (Vernon Supp. 1982); MONT. CODE
ANN. § 39-71-411 (Supp. 1979); NEV. REV. STAT. § 616.370 (1973); N.H. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 281.12 (Supp. 1981); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 52-1-9 (1978); N.Y. WORK. COMP.
LAW § 10 (McKinney 1965); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-10.1 (1979); N.D. CENT. CODE §
65-01-08 (1960); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4123.74 (Page 1980); OKLA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 85, § .11 (West Supp. 1981); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 77, § 481(a) (Purdon Supp. 1982);
R.I. GEN. LAWS § 28-29-20 (1979); S.C. CODE ANN. § 42-1-540 (Law. Co-op. 1976);
TENN. CODE ANN. § 50-908 (1977); TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 8306, § 3
(Vernon 1967); UTAH CODE ANN. § 35-1-60 (1953); VT.'STAT. ANN- tit. 21, § 622
(1978); VA. CODE § 65.1.40 (1980); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 102.03(2) (West Supp. 1982);
WYO. STAT. § 27-12-103 (1977).
For a general discussion of exclusive remedy provisions, see 2A A. LARSON, THE
LAW OF WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION § 65.10 (1982).
'" E.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 114-103 (Supp. 1982).
,00 E.g., Blankenship v. Cincinnati Milacron Chems., Inc., 69 Ohio St. 2d 608, 433
N.E.2d 572, 577 (1982); Mandolidis v. Elkins Indus., Inc., 246 S.E.2d 907, 913 (W.
Va. 1978).
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types of tort actions."0 ' Other jurisdictions have carved out legislative or
judicial exceptions to the exclusive remedy clause, reasoning that the
workers' compensation compromise never included intentional tort and
recklessness actions.' 2 This section examines the statutes and cases that
continue to permit plaintiffs to bring selected tort actions to punish and
deter egregious misconduct by employers.
1. Punitive Damages in Addition to Workers' Compensation
If the United States were to follow New Zealand's example, it would
regard workers' compensation benefits as a complete substitute for com-
pensatory damages and would permit the recovery of punitive damages
only as an independent cumulative remedy. However, the courts in the
United States have uniformly dismissed plaintiffs' independent punitive
damages actions on the basis of the exclusive remedy provisions.'"3 In
evaluating these decisions, it must be remembered that the United
States' workers' compensation statutes abrogate "all other rights and
,0, Eason v. Frontier Air Lines, Inc., 636 F.2d 293 (10th Cir. 1981) (applying Colo-
rado law to intentional violation of collective bargaining agreement); Sands v. Union
Camp Corp., 559 F.2d 1345 (5th Cir. 1977) (applying Georgia law to assault and
battery); Wilkins v. West Point-Pepperell, Inc., 397 So. 2d 115 (Ala. 1981) (fraud
prior to and after injury); Ellis v. Rocky Mountain Empire Sports, Inc., 43 Colo. App.
166, 602 P.2d 895 (1979) (intentional infliction of emotional distress causing physical
injury); Kofron v. Amoco Chem. Corp., 441 A.2d 226 (Del. 1982) (fraud prior to and
after injury); Southern Wire & Iron, Inc. v. Fowler, 217 Ga. 727, 124 S.E.2d 738
(1962) (battery); Burkhart v. Wells Elecs. Corp., 139 Ind. App. 658, 215 N.E.2d 879
(1966) (battery); Sewell v. Bathey Mfg. Co., 103 Mich. App. 732, 303 N.W.2d 876
(1981) (intentional violation of safety statute); Rico v. Precision Eng'g & Mfg. Co., 381
So. 2d 170 (Miss. 1980) (trespass to chattels). For a critical commentary on the Indi-
ana courts' construction of that state's exclusive remedy statute, see Note, Judicial Mis-
application of the Indiana Workmen's Compensation Act to Injuries Resulting from an
Employer's Wilful Conduct, 13 VAL. U.L. REV. 561 (1979).
102 See text accompanying notes 103-267 infra.
,0, Houston v. Bechtel Assocs. Prof. Corp., 522 F. Supp. 1094 (D.D.C. 1981) (ap-
plying Longshoremen's and Workers' Compensation Act to recklessness); Roof v. Vel-
sicol Chem. Corp., 380 F. Supp. 1373 (N.D. Ohio 1974) (applying Ohio law to fraud);
Woodell v. Washington Steel Corp., 269 F. Supp. 958 (W.D. Pa. 1967) (applying
Pennsylvania law to gross negligence); Evans v. Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry
Dock Co., 243 F. Supp. 1017 (E.D. Va. 1965) (applying Virginia law to willful failure
to maintain safe workplace); Coney v. International Minerals & Chem. Corp., 425 So.
2d 171 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983) ("culpable negligence"); Cunningham v. Aluminum
Co. of America, 417 N.E.2d 1186 (Ind. Ct. App. 1981) (intentional statutory viola-
tion); Lawrence v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 6 Kan. App. 2d 272, 627 P.2d 1168 (1981)
("wanton disregard" of safety in the workplace); Gambrell v. Kansas City Chiefs Foot-
ball Club, Inc., 562 S.W.2d 163 (Mo. App. 1978) (fraud); Beck v. Hamann, 263 Wis.
131, 56 N.W.2d 837 (1953) (deliberate intent).
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remedies,"'"" whereas the New Zealand Accident Compensation Act
bars only actions for "damages arising directly or indirectly out of the
injury or death" caused by accident.' 5 The broad language of the ex-
clusive remedy provisions makes it difficult for American courts to fol-
low the New Zealand precedent set in Donselaar.'°6 Furthermore, the
courts have held that eliminating punitive damages in workers' com-
pensation cases was part of the "trade-off" leading to the passage of
workers' compensation acts,' 7 and they have been reluctant to upset the
204 See text accompanying note 99 supra.
"' See text accompanying note 18 supra.
,06 See text accompanying notes 40-90 supra.
Even under more narrowly worded exclusive remedy provisions, courts in the United
States have refused to permit the recovery of punitive damages. In North v. United
States Steel Corp., 495 F.2d 810 (7th Cir. 1974), the plaintiff sought to rely on the
following qualification to Indiana's exclusive remedy statute: "Nothing in this act...
shall be construed to relieve any employer. . . from penalty for failure. . . to perform
any statutory duty." IND. CODE ANN. § 22-3-2-7 (Burns 1974). The plaintiff claimed
that punitive damages were a "penalty" which he should be permitted to recover upon
proof that his employer had recklessly violated Indiana's safe place statute. North v.
United States Steel Corp., 495 F.2d at 813. The court rejected the plaintiff's conten-
tion, holding that the qualification applies only to "a pecuniary charge imposed and
enforced by the state for the violation of the safe place statute." Id. at 814.
In a second case, the plaintiff urged a restrictive interpretation of Iowa's original
exclusive remedy statute, which exempted the employer from liability "'for the recov-
ery of damages or other compensation . . . .'" Stricklen v. Pearson Constr. Co., 185
Iowa 95, 98, 169 N.W. 628, 629 (1918) (emphasis added). The plaintiff contended that
the exclusive remedy provision applied only to compensatory damages. Id. at 97, 169
N.W. at 628. The court dismissed the claim for punitive damages on two grounds: 1)
the exclusive remedy statute bars any common law tort action; and 2) punitive damages
are recoverable only upon proof of actual or compensatory damages, which this plain-
tiff could not establish because he had already received workers' compensation benefits.
Id. at 97-98, 169 N.W. at 628-29. See also Evans v. Newport News Shipbuilding &
Dry Dock Co., 243 F. Supp. 1017, 1019 (E.D. Va. 1965). Although the first ground of
the opinion is unobjectionable, the second is highly questionable. The purpose of re-
quiring proof of compensatory damages as a condition for recovering punitive damages
in a recklessness action is to ensure that the plaintiff has established a prima facie case
of liability. See D. DOBBS, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF REMEDIES § 3.9, at 208-10
(1973) [hereafter D. DOBBS]. If a plaintiff establishes the fact of actual harm, punitive
damages should be available regardless of the receipt of workers' compensation benefits.
Id. at 210. See generally Singer v. Shop-Rite, Inc., 174 N.J. Super. 442, 416 A.2d 965
(1980) (punitive damages recoverable in battery action against employer when jury
specifically found that a battery had occurred, but awarded no compensatory damages).
For further discussion of this issue, see text accompanying notes 122-25 infra.
,0 E.g., Lawrence v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 6 Kan. App. 2d 272, 275, 627 P.2d
1168, 1170 (1981).
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delicate balance struck between the competing considerations.' °8 More-
over, courts have expressed concern that permitting punitive damages
would frustrate the legislature's policy of partial reimbursement.0 9
Given the comprehensive scope of the standard exclusive remedy
clause, punitive damages are currently available as an independent
remedy in addition to workers' compensation only with explicit legisla-
tive authorization. Texas is the one state that has passed such a statute:
"Nothing in this Act shall be taken . . . to prohibit the recovery of
exemplary damages by the surviving husband, wife, [or] heirs . . .of
any deceased employee whose death is occasioned by homicide from the
willful act or omission or gross negligence [of the employer].""'
Until recently, the Texas Supreme Court strictly construed the stat-
ute. t" ' As a result, very few plaintiffs' judgments were sustained on ap-
peal."1 ' But in Burk Royalty Co. v. Walls,"3 the court articulated a
more lenient test for gross negligence, permitting the plaintiff to estab-
lish that the defendant acted with conscious indifference to the plain-
tiff's rights by proving either passive or active misconduct." ' The court
"o' E.g., Houston v. Bechtel Assocs. Prof. Corp., 522 F. Supp. 1094, 1097 (D.D.C.
1981).
"' E.g., Roof v. Velsicol Chem. Corp., 380 F. Supp. 1373, 1374 (N.D. Ohio 1974).
110 TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 8306, § 5 (Vernon 1967).
The Texas Legislature distinguished between fatal and nonfatal accidents because it
was acting under the following state constitutional mandate:
Every person, corporation or company that may commit a homicide,
through willful act or omission, or gross neglect, shall be responsible, in
exemplary damages, to the surviving husband, widow, [or] heirs ....
Castleberry v. Frost-Johnson Lumber Co., 283 S.W. 141, 145 (Tex. Civ. App. 1926).
The constitutionality of the distinction between fatally and nonfatally injured employ-
ees has been challenged on equal protection grounds without success. McDonald v.
Sabayrac Battery Assocs., 620 S.W.2d 850 (Tex. Civ. App. 1981).
Corporate as well as individual employers may be held liable under the Act because
Texas holds corporations liable for the gross negligence or subsequently ratified gross
negligence of an employee. Nations & Bennett, Recovery of Exemplary Damages under
the Texas Workers' Compensation Act, 19 S. TEX. L.J. 431, 436-38 (1978) [hereafter
Nations & Bennett].
"' Nations & Bennett, note 110 supra, at 438-42. A comprehensive review of the
Texas cases defining the term "gross negligence" prior to 1981 appears in Burk Roy-
alty Co. v. Walls, 616 S.W.2d 911 (Tex. 1981).
2 Burk Royalty Co. v. Walls, 616 S.W.2d 911, 917-19 (Tex. 1981).
616 S.W.2d 911 (Tex. 1981).
", Id. at 922. Elsewhere in the opinion, the court said that "gross negligence" is
"that entire want of care which would raise the belief that the act or omission com-
plained of was the result of a conscious indifference to the right or welfare of the
person or persons affected by it." Id. at 920.
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also modified the standard of appellate review,' rejecting its prior
practice of overturning punitive damages verdicts whenever the defen-
dant could point to evidence in the record that "some care" had been
exercised." 6 The Burk Royalty court announced that it would reverse
punitive awards for plaintiffs only when there is "no evidence" to sup-
port the finding of gross negligence."1 7
Applying this modified standard of review, the court affirmed a
$100,000 punitive damages award to the widow of an oil rig worker
fatally burned in an oil and gas explosion."1 8 The evidence showed that
the defendant had not supplied proper safety equipment, had not pro-
hibited smoking near the oil rig, and had not instructed the crew on the
proper use of fire extinguishers." 9 There was no indication that the
defendant had acted for the purpose of causing harm to the plaintiff
nor with knowledge that harm was substantially certain to result.
Thus, Burk Royalty permits a plaintiff to recover punitive damages
against an employer upon a showing of recklessness. The court's hold-
ing is consistent with the language of the statute, 20 but represents a
significant departure from earlier cases construing it.21
Texas courts have traditionally adhered to the rule that punitive
damages can be recovered only upon proof of compensatory, and not
merely nominal, damages.' 22 Therefore, in the first suits under the stat-
ute, defendants contended that plaintiffs who had received workers'
compensation benefits could not maintain a separate action for punitive
damages because the exclusive remedy clause barred them from claim-
ing compensatory damages.' 3 This contention was rejected in People's
"I Id. at 920-22.
... E.g., Sheffield Div., Armco Steel Corp. v. Jones, 376 S.W.2d 825 (Tex. 1964).
... Burk Royalty Co. v. Walls, 616 S.W.2d 911, 922 (Tex. 1981).
" Id. at 925. The jury returned a verdict of $150,000, which the court of civil
appeals reduced to $100,000 to conform to plaintiff's pleading. Id. at 915.
11 Id. at 922-23.
.20 See text accompanying note 110 supra.
"12 In 1943, for example, the Texas Supreme Court dismissed an action for punitive
damages against an employer based on evidence very similar to that submitted in Burk
Royalty. Bennett v. Howard, 141 Tex. 101, 170 S.W.2d 709 (1943) (worker killed by
a gas pressure explosion or blowout in an oil well).
122 Nations & Bennett, note 110 supra, at 434.
2 E.g., People's Ice Co. v. Nowling, 16 S.W.2d 976, 978 (Tex. Civ. App. 1929).
These defendants claimed that only the plaintiffs who elected to bring an intentional
tort action for compensatory damages, instead of collecting workers' compensation bene-
fits, could sue for punitive damages. See generally Nations & Bennett, note 110 supra,
at 432.
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Ice Co. v. Nowling,'24 in which the court correctly observed: "[The
rule] means that where the cause of action asserted. . . is not sufficient
to support a recovery of actual damages, then no recovery of exemplary
damages can be had," and does not mean that both compensatory and
punitive damages "must invariably be recovered in the same suit."' 25
Thus, it appeared for a short time that Texas would permit workers'
compensation plaintiffs to recover punitive damages without proof of
compensatory damages. However, Texas courts have also ruled that ex-
emplary damages must be reasonably proportioned to the actual dam-
ages found.'"" In Fort Worth Elevators Co. v. Russell,"7 the court de-
cided to apply this rule in actions brought under the Texas statute. As
a result, plaintiffs are required to prove compensatory damages and the
jury must assess the amount of such damages, even though the judg-
ment is exclusively for punitive damages.'28
The advantage of the Texas statute is that it draws a clear distinc-
tion between 1) the compensatory and 2) the punitive and deterrent
functions of tort law. The workers' compensation act becomes the sole
source of compensation, thereby limiting the employer's liability for
compensatory damages. Punitive damages become the sole remedy for
punishing or deterring employer misconduct. The simplicity of this
scheme is appealing. The disadvantage of the Texas approach is that
punitive damages are awarded in a vacuum, since compensatory dam-
ages are no longer a part of the verdict. To overcome this problem, the
Texas courts continue to require proof of compensatory damages, even
though the judgment is exclusively for punitive damages. A simpler res-
olution of the problem would be to adopt the New Zealand approach,
and permit the recovery of punitive damages based upon proof of nomi-
nal damages or proof that actual harm was sustained.'2" The amount of
"2- 16 S.W.2d 976, 978-79 (Tex. Civ. App. 1929).
', Id. at 979.
Fort Worth Elevators Co. v. Russell, 123 Tex. 128, 150, 70 S.W.2d 397, 409
(1934).
,2, 123 Tex. 128, 150, 70 S.W.2d 397, 409 (1934).
E.g., Sheffield Div., Armco Steel Corp. v. Jones, 369 S.W.2d 71, 82-83 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1963), afl'd on other grounds, 376 S.W.2d 825 (Tex. 1964) (reversing puni-
tive damages judgment for the plaintiff because the jury erroneously had been informed
that the plaintiff would receive only the punitive, and not the actual, damages assessed
by the jury).
'" See text accompanying notes 86-88 supra. Cases that permit the recovery of puni-
tive damages based solely upon proof of nominal damages are collected in Annot., 17
A.L.R.2d 527, §§ 3, 6 (1951). For an analysis of existing case law, which concludes
that only two jurisdictions have held or implied that a finding of nominal damages will
be insufficient to support a punitive award, see J. GHIARDI & J. KIRCHER, PUNITIVE
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the punitive award would then be assessed exclusively with reference to
the nature of the defendant's conduct and the value of the defendant's
assets.'30
A possible alternative to permitting recovery of punitive damages in
tort would be to award them in workers' compensation proceedings.
But both courts' and commentators'32 have stated that it would be
inappropriate to introduce this element of tort liability into no-fault
proceedings. Instead, legislatures in several states have imposed per-
centage penalties on employers in the form of additional compensation
for various kinds of misconduct.'33 For example, California employers
are subject to a fifty percent penalty if they engage in "serious and
willful" misconduct."' In most other jurisdictions, the penalties range
from ten percent to fifteen percent of the benefits awarded.'35 Although
these statutory fines serve important deterrent and punitive functions,
they are not to be confused with punitive damages. The amount of the
statutory penalty is determined by the value of the employee's benefits,
whereas punitive damages are* assessed commensurate with the defen-
DAMAGES LAW AND PRACTICE § 5.37 (1981) [hereafter J. GHIARDI & J. KIRCHER].
For a criticism of California's adherence to the rule that punitive damages must bear a
reasonable relationship to compensatory damages, see Note, Punitive Damages and the
Reasonable Relation Rule: A Study in Frustration of Purpose, 9 PAC. L.J. 823 (1978).
,3 See text accompanying notes 89-90 supra. These two, criteria have always been
recognized as the primary factors to be considered in awarding punitive damages. D.
DOBBS, note 106 supra, § 3.9 at 218; J. GHIARDI & J. KIRCHER, note 129 supra, §§
5.01-5.04, 5.35-5.37; K. REDDEN,,PUNITIVE DAMAGES §§ 3.5(A), 3.5(C) (1980 &
Supp. 1982) [hereafter K. REDDEN]. For a cogent criticism of the rule that the punitive
award must be commensurate with-the compensatory award, see D. DOBBS, note 106
supra, § 3.9 at 210-11.
E.g., Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Stevenson, 368 S.W.2d 760, 763 (Tenn. 1963).
132 E.g., 2A A. LARSON, THE LAW OF WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION § 65.30, at 12-
18 (1982).
'I Id. at § 69.10.
CAL. LAB. CODE § 4553 (West Supp. 1983). Massachusetts imposes an even
more substantial 100% penalty for serious and willful misconduct. MASS. GEN. LAWS
ANN. ch. 152, § 28 (West 1958).
"I E.g., KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 342.165 (Baldwin 1979) (15%); Mo. ANN. STAT. §
287.120(4) (Vernon Supp. 1980) (15%); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 52-1-10(B).(1978) (10%);
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-12 (1979) (10%); OHIO CONST. art. II, § 35 (15-50% in discre-
tion of board); S.C. CODE § 42-9-70 (1976) (10%); UTAH CODE ANN. §35-1-12 (1953)
(15%); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 102.57 (West Supp. 1982) (15%, but no more than
$10,000).
1983]
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dant's wealth and the egregiousness of the defendant's conduct.136
2. Intentional Tort or Recklessness Actions for Punitive Damages in
Addition to Workers' .Compensation
A few courts137 and legislatures 38 in the United States permit an em-
ployee to bring an intentional tort or recklessness action in addition to a
claim for workers' compensation benefits. In these jurisdictions, plain-
tiffs may recover not only punitive damages, but also compensatory
damages, with an off-set for workers' compensation benefits. Thus
these jurisdictions recognize a cumulative cause of action for both com-
pensatory and punitive damages, whereas New Zealand and Texas cre-
ate a cumulative remedy for punitive damages alone.
a. Statutory Cause of Action: Oregon, Washington, and West
Virginia
Three states have passed the following type of legislation authorizing
employees to bring tort actions in addition to receiving workers' com-
pensation benefits:
If injury or death result to any employee from the deliberate intention
of his employer to produce such injury or death, the employee, the widow,
widower, child or dependent of the employee shall have the privilege to
take under this chapter, and shall also have cause of action against the
employer, as if this chapter had not been enacted, for any excess of dam-
ages over the amount received or receivable under this chapter."'
These statutes enhance the deterrent impact of the tort remedy by per-
mitting the plaintiff to sue for both compensatory and punitive dam-
ages. This obviates an analysis of whether punitive damages are recov-
erable without proof of compensatory damages, "' ° because both
remedies may be obtained in the same action. The critical question for
plaintiffs seeking punitive damages under these statutes is the meaning
of the phrase "deliberate intention."
Two jurisdictions, Oregon and Washington, have adopted a highly
,' E. Clemens Horst Co. v. Industrial Accident Comm'n, 184 Cal. 180, 192-93, 193
P. 105, 110 (1920) (California workers' compensation penalty is compensatory, not
punitive, and is therefore constitutional). See generally D. DOBBS, note 106 supra, §
3.9.
E.g., Johns-Manville Prods. Corp. v. Superior Ct., 27 Cal. 3d 465, 612 P.2d 948,
165 Cal. Rptr. 858 (1980).
,38 E.g., LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 23:1032 (West Supp. 1982).
," W. VA. CODE § 23-4-2 (1981) (emphasis added). Accord OR. REV. STAT. §
656.156 (1981); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 51.24.020 (Supp. 1982).
' See text accompanying notes 86-88, 122-28 supra.
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restrictive definition of the term, concluding that an employer acts with
"deliberate intention to produce injury" only if the employer acts for
the specific purpose of causing harm."' Plaintiffs have succeeded in
meeting this test only twice, by proving in one case that the defendant
set a spring gun aimed to cause serious bodily harm;'42 and by proving
in another case that the defendant struck an employee in the face with
a water pitcher.' 3 Oregon and Washington courts have refused to al-
low tort actions based on the doctrine of constructive intent"' or upon a
showing of recklessness. 45 Plaintiffs also have been denied relief despite
allegations of previous injury by the same machine' 6 or of the em-
ployer's failure to fix known defects.' 7
.. Jenkins v. Carman Mfg. Co., 79 Or. 448, 453-54, 155 P. 703, 705 (1916) (defen-
dant was aware of and failed to repair defect in conveyor belt that caused piece of
lumber to strike plaintiff; demurrer to complaint sustained for failure to allege deliber-
ate intention). The court defined "deliberate intention" as "prolonged premeditation,"
and said:
We think by the words 'deliberate intention to produce injury' that the
lawmakers meant to imply that the employer must have determined to
injure an employee and used some means appropriate to that end; that
there must be a specific intent, and not merely carelessness or negligence,
however gross.
Id. Accord Delthony v. Standard Furniture Co., 119 Wash. 298, 205 P. 379 (1922)
(defendant knew of defect in boiler that exploded, injuring plaintiff; complaint
dismissed).
,' Weis v. Allen, 147 Or. 670, 35 P.2d 478 (1934) (judgment for both compensa-
tory and punitive damages).
"4 Perry v. Beverage, 121 Wash. 652, 209 P. 1102 (1922), rev'd on other grounds,
214 P. 146 (1923) (plaintiff established deliberate intention, but judgment for plaintiff
reversed because of failure to plead and prove amount of workers' compensation offset).
See also Bibby y. Hillstrom, 260 Or. 367, 490P.2d 161 (1971) (judgment for defendant
in assault and battery action reversed on grounds that judge, not jury, should have
heard evidence regarding offset).
"' E.g., Higley v. Weyerhauser Co., 13 Wash. App. 269, 534 P.2d 596 (1975);
Winterroth v. Meats, Inc., 10 Wash. App. 7, 516 P.2d 522 (1973).
E.g., Duk Hwan Chung v. Fred Meyer, Inc., 276 Or. 809, 556 P.2d 683 (1976);
Caline v. Maede, 239 Or. 132, 396 P.2d 694 (1964); Heikkila v. Ewen Transfer Co.,
135 Or. 631, 297 P.. 373 (1931); Foster v. Allsop Automatic, Inc., 86 Wash. 2d 579,
547 P.2d 856 (1976); Biggs v. Donovan-Corkery Logging Co., 185 Wash. 284, 54 P.2d
235 (1936); Delthony v. Standard Furniture Co., 119 Wash. 298, 205 P. 379 (1922);
Peterick v. State, 22 Wash. App. 163, 589 P.2d 250 (1978).
Oregon has also refused to impose liability upon an employer who ratified the inten-
tional tort of battery by a security officer. Bakker v. Baza'r, Inc., 275 Or. 245, 551 P.2d
1269 (1976).
E.g., Caline v. Maede, 239 Or. 132, 396 P.2d 694 (1964).
E.g., Jenkins v. Carman Mfg. Co., 79 Or. 448, 155 P. 703 (1916); Delthony v.
Standard Furniture Co., 119 Wash. 298, 205 P. 379 (1922); Winterroth v. Meats, Inc.,
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Because employers rarely act for the specific purpose of causing
harm to their employees, the punitive and deterrent impact of the Ore-
gon and Washington statutes has been severely restricted. Plaintiffs
have asked the courts to reconsider their narrow definition of the
phrase "deliberate intention."' 8 The courts have declined, however, on
the grounds that their long-standing judicial construction is now part of
the statute, and that only the legislature can broaden the definition of
"deliberate intention.''49
In contrast, the West Virginia Supreme Court, construing a deliber-
ate intention statute exactly like Oregon's and Washington's, ° has
held that the statute permits recovery for both intentional torts (as de-
fined by the Restatement of Torts)'5 and recklessness." 2 The court re-
10 Wash. App. 7, 516 P.2d 522 (1973).
E.g., Winterroth v. Meats, Inc., 10 Wash. App. 7, 516 P.2d 522 (1973).
'' Foster v. Allsop Automatic, Inc., 86 Wash. 2d 579, 583, 547 P.2d 856, 858
(1976); Winterroth v. Meats, Inc., 10 Wash. App. 7, 13, 516 P.2d 522, 525 (1973).
,' See text accompanying note 139 supra.
... Mandolidis v. Elkins Indus., Inc., 246 S.E.2d 907, 914 (W. Va. 1978). The Re-
statement says that a person acts intentionally when he or she "desires to cause the
consequences" of his or her act, or "believes that the consequences are substantially
certain to result from it." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 8A (1965).
"' Mandolidis v. Elkins Indus., Inc., 246 S.E.2d 907, 914 (W. Va. 1978). Compare
text accompanying notes 141-47 supra.
The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia has vacillated on the definition of
"deliberate intention." Mandolidis, 246 S.E.2d at 911-13. In the first case decided
under the statute, the court rejected the restrictive definition adopted by the Oregon and
Washington courts. Collins v. Dravo, 114 W. Va. 229, 171 S.E. 757 (1933) (plaintiff
stated cause of action by alleging that defendant knew overhanging bank had previously
caved in and would probably do so again, yet ordered plaintiff to work in this "death
trap"). But three years later, the court defined "deliberate intention" as a "specific
intent ...to cause the injury." Allen v. Raleigh-Wyoming Mining Co., 117 W. Va.
631, 634, 186 S.E. 612, 614 (1936) (defendant replaced canvas trapdoor across track in
coalmine with wooden trapdoor, but allegedly did not warn plaintiff, and plaintiff was
struck by wooden trapdoor while riding at front of empty mine cars; judgment for
plaintiff reversed). Accord Brewer v. Appalachian Constructors, Inc., 135 W. Va. 739,
750, 65 S.E.2d 87, 94 (1951). In Mandolidis, the court returned to the more liberal
Collins definition because it believed that "reading the language of the provision under
review here to mean the same thing as similar wording in a criminal statute defining
murder is contrary to the basic rules governing the construction of workmen's compen-
sation statutes." 245 S.E.2d at 913.
While this article was in press, the West Virginia Legislature passed an amendment
to section 23-4-2 of the West Virginia code, nullifying the Mlandolidis definition of
"deliberate intention." Enrolled Comm. Substitute for H.B. 1201, 66th Leg., 1983
Regular Sess. (to be codified at W. VA. CODE § 23-4-2(c)). The amendment provides
that the "deliberate intention" standard "requires a showing of an actual, specific in-
tent" and may not be satisfied by proof of recklessness. Id. (to be codified at W. VA.
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fused to believe that the legislature intended to give entrepreneurs the
right to "carry on their enterprises without any regard to the life and
limb of the participants in the endeavor and free from all common law
liability."' 3 Therefore, in Mandolidis v. Elkins Industries, Inc.,'"4 the
court concluded that an employer's misconduct will remove the immu-
nity bar if it is undertaken with a knowledge and an appreciation of the
high degree of risk of physical harm to another created by the miscon-
duct. The court distinguished recklessness from nonactionable negli-
gence, saying that "[lliability will require 'a strong probability that
harm may result.'"" The plaintiff in Mandolidis lost two fingers in
the defendant's unguarded table saw blade..5 6 The court reversed a
summary judgment for the defendant,'57 finding that the plaintiff had
established sufficient facts to permit an inference that the defendant had
known the unguarded saw blades were in violation of safety regulations
and had caused previous injuries, but had ordered the plaintiff to oper-
ate the saw without safety guards to improve production speed and thus
increase profits.'58
Mandolidis gives maximum effect to the punitive and deterrent func-
tions of tort law because it permits common law actions whenever pu-
nitive damages are potentially recoverable.' 9 No longer may employers
CODE § 23-4-2(c)(2)(i)).
." Mandolidis v. Elkins Indus., Inc., 246 S.E.2d 907, 913 (W. Va. 1978).
"' 246 S.E.2d 907, 914 (W. Va. 1978).
'5 Id.
"I ld.
'" Id. at 918.
... Id. at 914-18. Two other cases were consolidated with Mandolidis. In Snodgrass
v. United States Steel Corp., the court reversed a summary judgment for the defendant,
holding that the plaintiff had established sufficient facts to permit an inference that the
defendant had deliberately violated occupational safety and building construction stan-
dards. Id. at 918-19. In Dishmon v. Eastern Assoc. Coal Corp., the court held that the
plaintiff had stated a cause of action by alleging that the defendant had knowingly
allowed employees to work in conditions that were in violation of roof support regula-
tions for coal mines. Id. at 919-21. Mandolidis requires subjective knowledge of the
danger, which means that neither negligence nor gross negligence will suffice. Smith v.
ACF Indus., Inc., 687 F.2d 40 (4th Cir. 1982) (applying West Virginia law to reverse
trial court's denial of directed verdict for defendant who had no notice that machinery
would cause serious injury).
"' Punitive damages are recoverable upon proof of either malice or conscious disre-
gard for the safety of others. D. DOBBS, note 106 supra, § 3.9 at 205-06; J. GHIARDI &
J. KIRCHER, note 129 supra, §§ 5.01-.04. For a collection of the judicial or legislative
definitions of the state of mind required to award punitive damages in each of the
jurisdictions which permits recovery of such damages, see J. GHIARDI & J. KIRCHER,
note 129 supra, § 5.01.
19831
HeinOnline  -- 16 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 255 1982-1983
University of California, Davis
in West Virginia knowingly disregard safety statutes and warnings
with impunity. On the other hand, critics argue that the decision will
subject employers to a flood of litigation and will require them to carry
liability insurance for their reckless acts.'6 Not only will suits be filed
by employees, but employers will also be subject to actions for contribu-
tion. For example, in Sydenstricker v. Unipunch Products, Inc., t the
manufacturers of allegedly defective industrial equipment, who had
been sued by injured employees, were permitted to seek contribution
from the allegedly reckless employer on a concurrent tortfeasor theory.
In assessing the negative ramifications of Mandolidis, it is important
to realize that only the employer's liability for compensatory damages
subjects the employer to contribution actions by third-party defendants.
Most jurisdictions prohibit joint and several liability for punitive dam-
ages, and instead assess them separately against each individual defen-
dant. Therefore, contribution for punitive damages is inappropriate.
16
1
Similarly, the employer's liability for compensatory damages necessi-
tates the purchase of insurance. Many jurisdictions have prohibited in-
surance coverage of punitive damages as a matter of public policy, and
West Virginia could adopt this approach either by statute or by judicial
decision.' 3 Thus, if employers were liable in tort for punitive damages
The West Virginia Legislature's 1983 amendment to W. VA. CODE § 23-4-2 contin-
ues to permit common law actions for compensatory damages against employers who
act with a deliberate intention to injure or kill an employee. However, the amendment
bars the recovery of punitive damages altogether. Enrolled Comm. Substitute for H.B.
1201, 66th Leg., 1983 Regular Sess. (to be codified at W. VA. CODE § 23-4-
2(c)(2)(iii)(A)). The amendment is thus contrary to the recommendations in the text
accompanying notes 162-63 infra.
,"0 Note, Employer Liability in West Virginia: Compensation Beyond the Law, 36
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 151 (1979) (criticizes court for vacillating in its definition of
"deliberate intention" and recommends that legislature adopt workers' compensation
penalty instead of authorizing common law tort against employer who engages in reck-
less misconduct).
"6 288 S.E.2d 511 (W. Va. 1982).
162 For cases assessing punitive damages against joint tortfeasors on an individual
basis, see Thomson v. Catalina, 205 Cal. 402, 271 P. 198 (1928); Fredeen v. Stride,
269 Or. 369, 525 P.2d 166 (1974) (overruling prior cases that required assessment of
single punitive award against joint tortfeasors); Huckeby v. Spangler, 563 S.W.2d 555,
559-60 (Tenn. 1978) (apportionment of punitive damages emphasizes the penal and
deterrent nature of exemplary damages). See also Note, Apportionment of Punitive
Damages, 38 VA. L. REV. 71 (1952); Annot., 20 A.L.R.3d 666 (1968).
" D. DOBBS, note 106 supra, § 3.9 at 216-17; J. GHIARDI & J. KIRCHER, note 129
supra, §§ 7.11, 7.13; K. REDDEN, note 130 supra, §§ 9.1, 9.4-.5; Note, Insurance for
Punitive Damages: A Reevaluation, 28 HASTINGS L.J. 431 (1976); Annot., 16
A.L.R.4th 11, § 3 (1982). Prohibiting insurance coverage advances the punitive and
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only, as in New Zealand and Texas, the problems created by contribu-
tion actions and insurance coverage could be eliminated. Furthermore,
because plaintiffs would have less incentive to sue, the flood of litigation
might be reduced. Tort liability would then be imposed strictly to deter
and punish the employer's egregious misconduct, while workers' com-
pensation benefits would be the sole source of compensation.
b. Judicially Created Cause of Action: California
Most jurisdictions authorizing cumulative tort actions against em-
ployers have enacted legislation to that effect."' In California, however,
cumulative remedies have been sanctioned in certain circumstances by
judicial opinion. ' 5 The leading opinion is Johns-Manville Products
deterrent functions of the punitive damages award because the defendant cannot shift
the loss to the insurance company. Owen, Punitive Damages in Products Liability Liti-
gation, 74 MICH. L. REV. 1257, 1313 (1976) (recommending that punitive damages not
be insurable in products liability litigation). Some jurisdictions permit insurance cover-
age of punitive damages, but primarily in cases of grossly negligent or reckless (as
opposed to intentional) misconduct and in cases of vicarious liability (as opposed to
liability based on complicity). D. DOBBS, note 106 supra, § 3.9 at 216-17; J. GHIARDI
& J. KIRCHER, note 129 supra, §§ 7.12, 7.14; K. REDDEN, note 130 supra, §§ 9.4-.5;
Riley, Punitive Damages: The Doctrine of Just Enrichment, 27 DRAKE L. REV. 195,
241-43 (1977-78); Note, Punitive Damages and Liability Insurance: Theory, Reality
and Practicality, 9 CUM. L. REV. 487 (1978); Annot., 16 A.L.R.4th 11 (1982). It
would seem appropriate to prohibit insurance coverage of punitive damages in actions
against employers for work-related injuries, since liability is either direct or based on
complicity and imposed only upon proof of intent to harm or conscious disregard of
safety. See generally J. GHIARDI & J. KIRCHER, note 129 supra, §§ 5.05-.14. Under
analogous circumstances, the California Legislature has prohibited insurance coverage
of the workers' compensation statutory penalty. CAL. INS. CODE § 11661 (West 1972).
184 See text accompanying notes 139-40 supra.
161 Johns-Manville Prods. Corp. v. Superior Ct., 27 Cal. 3d 465, 612 P.2d 948, 165
Cal. Rptr. 858 (1980) (employer deliberately concealed work-related disease, thereby
aggravating employee's injury); Unruh v. Truck Ins. Exch., 7 Cal. 3d 616, 498 P.2d
1063, 102 Cal. Rptr. 815 (1972) (workers' compensation insurance carrier, which en-
joyed employer's immunity under California workers' compensation legislation, com-
mitted assault, battery and intentional infliction of emotional distress on employee;
"dual capacity" theory of liability); Meyer v. Graphic Arts Int'l Union, 88 Cal. App.
3d 176, 151 Cal. Rptr. 597 (2d Dist. 1979) (employer's agent raped employee); Mag-
liulo v. Superior Ct., 47 Cal. App. 3d 760, 121 Cal. Rptr. 621 (1st Dist. 1975) (em-
ployer assaulted and battered employee).
For a discussion of the California cases governing an employer's liability for commit-
ting an intentional tort, see 2 W. HANNA, CALIFORNIA LAW OF EMPLOYEE INJURIES
AND WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION § 22.02[3] (2d ed. 1982); J. MASTORIS, CIVIL LrI.
GATION AND WORKERS' COMPENSATION 1-14 (1980); Demler, Remedy for the Inten-
tional Torts of a Workmen's Compensation Carrier, I PEPPERDINE L. REV. 54 (1973);
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Corp. v. Superior Court,' in which the plaintiff-employee sued his
employer for compensatory and punitive damages, alleging that the de-
fendant had fraudulently concealed from him (and the company doctor)
Tomita, The Exclusive Remedy of Workers' Compensation for Intentional Torts of the
Employer: Johns-Manville Products v. Superior Court, 18 CAL. W.L. REV. 27 (1981);
Comment, Johns-Manville Products Corp. v Superior Court: The Not-So-Exclusive
Remedy Rule, 33 HASTINGS L.J. 263 (1981); Comment: Azevedo v. Abel: Denial of
Employee's Right to Sue His Employer for an Intentional Tort, 21 HASTINGS L.J. 683
(1970); Comment, Intentional Employer Torts and Workers' Compensation: A Legal
Morass, 11 PAC. L.J. 187 (1979); Comment, Johns-Manville v. Superior Court: Em-
ployee's Right to Sue Employer for Aggravating an Industrial Disease, 14 U.C. DAVIS
L. REV. 767 (1981); Comment, Intentional Employer Torts: A Matter for the Califor-
nia Legislature, 15 U.S.F.L. REV. 651 (1981); Annot., 9 A.L.R.4th 778 (1981).
The California Legislature recently amended the workers' compensation statute to
provide for a cumulative tort action against employers under specified circumstances:
(a) Where the conditions of compensation set forth in Section 3600 con-
cur, the right to recover such compensation is, except as specifically pro-
vided in this section and Sections 3706 and 4558, the sole and exclusive
remedy of the employee or his or her dependents against the employer,
and the fact that either the employee or the employer also occupied an-
other or dual capacity prior to, or at the time of, the employee's industrial
injury shall not permit the employee or his or her dependents to bring an
action at law for damages against the employer.
(b) An employee, or his or her dependents in the event of his or her
death, may bring an action at law for damages against the employer, as if
this division did not apply, in the following instances:
(1) Where the employee's injury or death is proximately caused
by a willful physical assault by the employer.
(2) Where the employee's injury is aggravated by the employer's
fraudulent concealment of the existence of the injury and its connec-
tion with the employment, in which case the employer's liability
shall be limited to those damages proximately caused by the aggra-
vation. The burden of proof respecting apportionment of damages
between the injury and any subsequent aggravation thereof is upon
the employer.
(3) Where the employee's injury or death is proximately caused
by a defective product manufactured by the employer and sold,
leased, or otherwise transferred for valuable consideration to an in-
dependent third person, and that product is thereafter provided for
the employee's use by a third person.
(c) In all cases where the conditions of compensation set forth in Section
3600 do not concur, the liability of the employer shall be the same as if
this division had not been enacted.
Act of Sept. 10, 1982, ch. 922, § 6, 1982 Cal. Legis. Serv. 4949 (West) (to be codified
at CAL. LAB. CODE § 3602). The statute codifies those cases discussed in this section
which authorize a cumulative tort action.
16, 27 Cal. 3d 465, 612 P.2d 948, 165 Cal. Rptr. 858 (1980).
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that the plaintiff was suffering from asbestosis. This concealment alleg-
edly prevented the plaintiff from receiving treatment for the disease,
and induced him to continue to work in an unsafe environment. The
California Supreme Court permitted the tort action to proceed despite
the plaintiff's pending application for workers' compensation benefits."'
The court held that the employer should be allowed a set-off if the
plaintiff were awarded disability benefits."'
In determining whether to allow the tort action in Johns-Manville,
the court reviewed the California workers' compensation act, observing
that victims of "serious and willful misconduct" could recover not only
compensatory benefits, but also a penalty equal to fifty percent of the
compensatory benefits.'" 9 Based on this, the court concluded that the
legislature must have intended the act to cover injuries caused by an
employer's reckless or intentional misconduct. "' The court then ob-
served that the act contained an exclusive remedy clause, which
provided:
Where the conditions of compensation exist, the right to-recover such
compensation ...is . . . the exclusive remedy for injury or death of an
employee against the employer or against any other employee of the em-
ployer acting within the scope of his employment, except that an em-
ployee, or his dependents in the event of his death, shall, 'in addition to the
right to compensation against the employer, have a right to bring an action
at law for damages against such other employee, as if this division did not
apply, in either of the following cases:
(1) When the injury or death is proximately caused by the willful and
unprovoked physical act of aggression of such other employee.
(2) When the injury or death is proximately caused by the intoxication
"6 Id. at 478, 612 P.2d at 956, 165 Cal. Rptr. at 866.
Id. at 479, 612 P.2d at 956, 165 Cal. Rptr. at 866.
",6 CAL. LAB. CODE § 4553 (West Supp. 1982). Section 4553 has been amended to
provide:
The amount of compensation otherwise recoverable shall be increased one-
half, together with costs and expenses not to exceed two hundred fifty dol-
lars' ($250), where the employee is injured by reason of the serious and
willful misconduct of any of the following:
(a) The employer, or his managing representative.
(b) If the employer is a partnership, on the part of one of the partners
or a managing representative or general superintendent thereof.
(c) If the employer is a corporation, on the part'.of an executive, manag-
ing officer, or general superintendent thereof.
Act of Sept. 10, 1982, ch. 922, § 10, 1982 Cal. Legis. Serv. 4949, 4950 (West) (to be
codified at.CAL. LAB. CODE § 4553).
"0 Johns-Manville Prods. Corp. v. Superior Ct., 27 Cal. 3d 465, 473, 612 P.2d 948,
953, 165 Cal. Rptr. 858, 863 (1980).
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of such other employee."'
On its face, the exclusive remedy provision appeared to create a blanket
immunity for the employer. However, the Johns-Manville court re-
viewed prior cases'72 and discovered that "in some exceptional circum-
stances" the employer is not free from tort liability for its intentional
acts, even if the resulting injuries to its employees are compensable
under workers' compensation.173
The court classified the "exceptional circumstances" as cases in
which "the employer acts deliberately for the purpose of injuring the
employee" and in which "the harm resulting from the intentional mis-
conduct consists of aggravating an initial work-related injury."' 74 The
court concluded that the plaintiff was entitled to bring a cumulative tort
action for fraud, based on the allegations that the employer had deliber-
ately concealed the existence of the employee's disease and had thereby
aggravated it.' The court was unwilling to believe that the legislature
had intended for the exclusive remedy clause "to insulate such flagrant
conduct from tort liability."' 7 6
The California Supreme Court explicitly declined to decide whether
its holding in Johns-Manville should be extended to encompass assault
and battery or other intentional torts. " However, the Johns-Manville
court did rely heavily 7" on Magliulo v. Superior Court,' a case in
which a waitress sued her employer for assault and battery. The em-
ployer had hit the waitress and thrown her to the ground in a fit of
" CAL. LAB. CODE § 3601 (West Supp. 1982). Section 3601 has been amended to
apply exclusively to actions against co-employees. Act of Sept. 10, 1982, ch. 922, § 5,
1982 Cal. Legis. Serv. 4948, 4949 (West) (to be codified at CAL. LAB. CODE § 3601).
Actions against employers are now governed by Section 3602, quoted in note 165
supra.
"I See cases cited in note 165 supra.
75 Johns-Manville Prods. Corp. v. Superior Ct., 27 Cal. 3d 465, 473, 612 P.2d 948,
953, 165 Cal. Rptr. 858, 863 (1980).
17 Id. at 476, 612 P.2d at 955, 165 Cal. Rptr. at 865.
"I Id. at 477, 612 P.2d at 955, 165 Cal. Rptr. at 865.
1" Id. at 478, 612 P.2d at 956, 165 Cal. Rptr. at 866.
"' Id. at 477 n.l1, 612 P.2d at 956 n.l1, 165 Cal. Rptr. at 865 n. 1. For a discus-
sion of this question, see Comment, Johns-Manville Products Corp. v. Superior Court:
The Not-So-Exdusive Remedy Rule, 33 HASTINGS L.J. 263 (1981); Comment, Inten-
tional Employer Torts: A Matter for the California Legislature, 15 U.S.F.L. REV. 651
(1981).
'7 Johns-Manville Prods. Corp. v. Superior Ct., 27 Cal. 3d 465, 475-77, 612 P.2d
948, 954-56, 165 Cal. Rptr. 858, 864-65 (1980).
"1 47 Cal. App. 3d 760, 121 Cal. Rptr. 621 (1st Dist. 1975).
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anger, causing injuries to her back.1s0 The Magliulo court observed that
had the employer been a co-employee, the workers' compensation stat-
ute would have permitted the plaintiff to sue him in addition to receiv-
ing disability benefits. 8 ' Because a cumulative tort remedy would have
been available to the plaintiff against the defendant as a co-employee,
the court held that the legislature must also have intended to authorize
a cumulative tort remedy against the defendant as an employer:'82 "If
the employee can recover both compensation and damages caused by an
intentional assault by a fellow worker, he should have no less right
because the fellow worker happens to be his boss."' 83
At the core of the Johns-Manville and Magliulo decisions is the con-
viction that, although employees are "willing to surrender [their rights]
to an action at common law for the ordinary type of work-related inju-
ries,"'" they never contemplated losing their common law remedies for
such flagrant employer misconduct as battery' 85 or the intentional con-
cealment of knowledge that the employee had contracted a serious dis-
ease from the work environment.8 6 Other California cases have charac-
terized the employer who deliberately acts to injure an employee as
acting "outside the scope of employment.' 8 7 Under these decisions, the
Id. at 763, 121 Cal. Rptr. at 624.
"' CAL. LAB. CODE § 3601(1) (West Supp. 1982), quoted in text accompanying note
171 supra.
Approximately twelve other jurisdictions that have immunized co-employees permit
intentional tort actions to be brought against them. See 2A A. LARSON, THE LAW OF
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION §§ 72.21, 72.26 (1982); Annot., 21 A.L.R.3d 845, §§ 10-
11 (1968). The Alaska Supreme Court has authorized a cumulative intentional tort
action against co-employees on a theory that could be extended to employers as well.
Elliot v. Brown, 569 P.2d 1323 (Alaska 1977).
"I Magliulo v. Superior Ct., 47 Cal. App. 3d 760, 772-73, 121 Cal. Rptr. 621, 630-
31 (1st Dist. 1975).
Id. at 773, 121 Cal. Rptr. at 631.
"' Johns-Manville Prods. Corp. v. Superior Ct., 27 Cal. 3d 465, 477, 612 P.2d 948,
955, 165 Cal. Rptr. 858, 865 (1980).
"I Magliulo v. Superior Ct., 47 Cal. App. 3d 760, 778, 121 Cal. Rptr. 621, 635 (1st
Dist. 1975).
,"6 Johns-Manville Prods. Corp. v. Superior Ct., 27 Cal. 3d 465, 477, 612 P.2d 948,
955-56, 165 Cal. Rptr. 858, 865 (1980).
I"7 E.g., Busick v. Workmen's Comp. Appeals Bd., 7 Cal. 3d 967, 500 P.2d 1386,
104 Cal. Rptr. 42 (1972) (affirming $500,000 compensatory damages and $150,000
punitive damages award to employee who was shot by employer, but dismissing plain-
tiff's claim for workers' compensation benefits; dissenting judge would have permitted
recovery of both tort damages and benefits because plaintiff would have been entitled to
both in action against co-employee).
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plaintiff has two alternative or mutually exclusive remedies: 88 workers'
compensation for ordinary, work-related injuries and tort liability for
flagrant misconduct." The advantage of the cumulative tort action in
Johns-Manville and Magliulo is that the plaintiff can obtain prompt
payment of workers' compensation benefits and retain the right to sue
the employer for compensatory and punitive damages.'9°
3. Intentional Tort or Recklessness Actions for Punitive Damages
in Lieu of Workers' Compensation
Although the recognition of a cumulative tort cause of action is ad-
vantageous to the worker and procedurally convenient, most jurisdic-
tions have authorized instead an alternative cause of action."9 ' In these
states, the injured worker may receive either workers' compensation
"a Id.; Eckis v. Sea World Corp., 64 Cal. App. 3d 1, 134 Cal. Rptr. 183 (4th Dist.
1976) (secretary injured while riding a whale was acting within scope of employment;
tort judgment for plaintiff based on fraud reversed); Azevedo v. Abel, 264 Cal. App. 2d
451, 70 Cal. Rptr. 710 (3d Dist. 1968) (affirming award of workers' compensation
benefits to victim of intentional assault and battery by employer; dismissal of tort action
affirmed); Carter v. Superior Ct., 142 Cal. App. 2d 350, 298 P.2d 598 (2d Dist. 1956)
(plaintiff who had received workers' compensation benefits for intentional assault by
employer could not subsequently file tort action for compensatory and punitive dam-
ages). For a discussion of the alternative tort cause of action authorized by these cases,
see text accompanying notes 191-267 infra.
189 An employer who is sued in tort and who wishes to assert that the exclusive
remedy clause bars the plaintiff's recovery must assert the affirmative defense in the
answer, and cannot raise it for the first time on appeal. Doney v. Tambouratgis, 23
Cal. 3d 91, 587 P.2d 1160, 151 Cal. Rptr. 347 (1979) (employer sexually assaulted
and battered employee; judgment for $3945 compensatory and $12,500 punitive dam-
ages affirmed).
"0 Several commentators have recommended the recognition of a cumulative tort
cause of action. See, e.g., Marcus, Advocating the Rights of the Injured, 61 MICH. L.
REV. 921 (1963); Comment, Johns-Manville Products Corp. v. Superior Court: The
Not-So-Exclusive Remedy Rule, 33 HASTINGS L.J. 263 (1981); Comment, Intentional
Employer Torts: A Matter for the California Legislature, 15 U.S.F.L. REV. 651
(1981).
"I For a discussion of the alternative tort action, see 2A A. LARSON, THE LAW OF
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION §§ 67.22, 68.11-.23 (1982); Birnbaum & Wrubel, Work-
ers' Compensation and the Employer's Immunity Shield: Recent Exceptions to Exclu-
sivity, 5 J. PRODS. LIAB. 119, 119-32 (1982); Page, The Exclusivity of the Workmen's
Compensation Remedy: The Employee's Right to Sue His Employer in Tort, 4 B.C.
IND. & COM. L. REV. 555, 559-67 (1963); Schmidt & German, Employer Misconduct
as Affecting the Exclusiveness of Workmen's Compensation, 18 U. PiTT. L. REV. 81
(1956); Note, Workmen's Compensation: Employer Misconduct and the Exclusive
Remedy, 32 OKLA. L. REV. 704 (1979); Note, Judicial Misapplication of the Indiana
Workmen's Compensation Act to Injuries Resulting from Employer's Wilful Conduct,
13 VAL. U.L. REV. 561 (1979); Annot., 96 A.L.R.3d 1064 (1979).
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benefits or tort damages, but not both.
a. Statutory Cause of Action
Seven jurisdictions have statutes creating an alternative cause of ac-
tion. Three states have worded their legislation to give the plaintiff an
explicit option:
If injury or death results to an employee through the deliberate inten-
tion of his employer to produce such injury or death, the employee or his
dependents may take under this chapter, or in lieu thereof, have a cause of
action at law against the employer as if this chapter had not been passed
192
The other four states have created statutory exceptions to the exclusive
remedy clause for "wilful or unprovoked physical aggression"'93 and
intentional torts," 4 wrongs"' or acts."96
For a plaintiff seeking punitive damages, the critical question is the
meaning of the phrases "deliberate intention," "wilful misconduct,"
"wilful aggression," "intentional wrong" and "intentional act.""' 7 The
cases indicate that the Arizona, Idaho and New Jersey courts have in-
terpreted the phrases "wilful misconduct,"' '  "wilful aggression,"'
92 KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 342.610(4) (Baldwin 1979). Accord MD. ANN. CODE
art. 101, § 44 (1957). The Arizona statute is worded somewhat differently:
A. The right to recover compensation pursuant to this chapter for inju-
ries sustained by an employee ... is the exclusive remedy against the
employer . . ., except that if the injury is caused by the employer's wilful
misconduct, . . and the act causing the injury is the personal act of the
employer, . . and the act indicates a wilful disregard of the life, limb or
bodily safety of employees, the injured employee may either claim com-
pensation or maintain an action at law for damages ....
B. "Wilful misconduct" as used in this section means an act done
knowingly and purposely with the direct object of injuring another.
ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 23-1022 (1971).
,' IDAHO CODE § 72-209 (1973).
,, S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 62-3-2 (1978).
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 34:15-8 (West Supp. 1982).
,96 LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 23:1032 (West Supp. 1982).
' For a discussion of the term "deliberate intention" as used in statutes creating a
cumulative cause of action, see text accompanying notes 139-55 supra.
' Serna v. Statewide Contractors, Inc., 6 Ariz. App. 12, 429 P.2d 504 (1967). Ac-
cord Johnson v Kerr-McGee Oil Indus., Inc., 129 Ariz. 393, 631 P.2d 548 (Ariz. Ct.
App. 1981) (complaint dismissed despite allegations that employer fraudulently failed
to warn employee of health hazards to which he would be exposed by uranium min-
ing); Lowery v. Universal Match Corp., 6 Ariz. App. 98, 430 P.2d 444 (1967) (sum-
mary judgment affirmed for defendant-employer alleged to have knowingly disregarded
safety measures regarding chemicals and gases).
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and "intentional wrong"' 0 to mean "deliberate intention." Further-
more, the courts in Arizona,2"' Idaho, °2 Kentucky," 3 Maryland ' and
New Jersey"0 5 have adopted the "deliberate intention" test developed
under the Oregon and Washington statutes.0 6 As a result, the plaintiff
must prove that the defendant acted for the specific purpose of causing
harm, a burden which no plaintiff has met. Neither allegations of reck-
lessness nor constructive intent will suffice. For example, in one of the
more egregious cases, a widow was denied a tort remedy for the death
of her husband, who was killed by the cave-in of a sandy ditch.0 7 State
safety inspectors had warned the employer that the sides of the ditch
were not sloped properly.0 8 Furthermore, the ditch had caved in once
before on the victim.20 9 The employer's conduct clearly would have sat-
isfied West Virginia's definition of "deliberate intention,"21° but did not
meet the stringent criteria set by the Oregon and Washington courts. 11
Unless the courts or legislatures in these five jurisdictions modify the
restrictive definition of "deliberate intention," their alternative tort ac-
tions will have only a slight punitive and deterrent impact." '
"' Provo v. Bunker Hill Co., 393 F. Supp. 778, 782 n.1, 785-86 (D. Idaho 1975)
(applying Idaho law in granting summary judgment for defendant-employer alleged to
have known of prior incidents when molten zinc burst from uncovered pot, injuring
other workers).
200 Bryan v. Jeffers, 103 N.J. Super. 522, 248 A.2d 129 (1968) (per curiam).
2", See cases cited in note 198 supra.
'20 See case cited in note 199 supra.
203 McCray v. Davis H. Elliott Co., 419 S.W.2d 542 (Ky. Ct. App. 1967) (summary
judgment for defendant affirmed despite allegations that employer intentionally directed
employee to work on a tall pole in extremely dangerous proximity to highly charged
wire); Fryman v. Electric Steam Radiator Corp., 277 S.W.2d 25 (Ky. Ct. App. 1955)
(complaint dismissed despite allegations that defendant had been notified that metal
press which injured plaintiff was dangerous).
204 Schatz v. York Steak House Sys., Inc., 51 Md. App. 1045, 444 A.2d 1045 (1982)
(summary judgment for defendant-employer affirmed; plaintiff had been raped by co-
employee who was not "alter-ego" of employer, thus precluding imposition of vicarious
liability).
205 Copeland v. Johns-Manville Prods. Corp., 492 F. Supp. 498 (D.N.J. 1980)
(plaintiff denied leave to amend complaint to allege fraudulent concealment of exposure
to asbestos on job); Bryan v. Jeffers, 103 N.J. Super. 522, 248 A.2d 129 (1968) (per
curiam).
20. See text accompanying notes 141-49 supra.
20, Serna v. Statewide Contractors, Inc., 6 Ariz. App. 12, 429 P.2d 504 (1967).
208 Id. at 14, 429 P.2d at 506.
20, Id. at 13, 429 P.2d at 505.
2,0 See note 152 supra.
211 See text accompanying notes 141-47 supra.
2,2 There are no cases construing the South Dakota statute. S.D. CODIFIED LAWS
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Louisiana has most recently recognized an employee's right to sue an
employer in tort. In 1976, the legislature expanded the scope of the
exclusive remedy clause to cover not only employers, but also co-em-
ployees, and simultaneously created the following exception: "Nothing
in this Chapter shall affect the liability of the employer . . . or em-
ployee . . ., civil or criminal, resulting from an intentional act."2 3 Ini-
tially, the intermediate appellate courts strictly construed this exception,
and required proof that the defendant "consciously committed an act
which the defendant actively desired and believed was substantially cer-
tain to result in injury to the employee." ' Not surprisingly, plaintiffs'
actions were consistently dismissed.2 ' Then, in 1981, the Louisiana Su-
preme Court ruled that plaintiffs could recover based on proof of either
deliberate or constructive intent:
The meaning of "intent" is that the person who acts either (1) con-
sciously desires the physical result of his act, whatever the likelihood of
that result happening from his conduct; or (2) knows that that result is
substantially certain to follow from his conduct, whatever his desire may
be as to that result. '
6
ANN. § 62-3-2 (1978).
2I LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 23:1032 (West Supp. 1982). For a discussion of the
amendment to the statute, see W. MALONE, LOUISIANA CIVIL LAW TREATISE: WORK-
ERS' COMPENSATION LAW & PRACTICE § 365 (2d ed. 1980 & Supp. 1982).
It is not clear from the language of the statute whether the legislature intended to
create a cumulative or an alternative tort action. Most of the reported cases make no
reference to the plaintiff having received workers' compensation benefits, and the stat-
ute does not provide for a set-off of workers' compensation benefits. Compare statute
quoted in text accompanying note 139 supra. Therefore, for the purposes of this Arti-
cle, the statute is being classified as creating an alternative cause of action. However, in
Rennier v. Johnson, 410 So. 2d 1149 (La. Ct. App. 1981), a worker who had received
workers' compensation benefits for an assault by a supervisory -co-employee was per-
mitted to proceed with an intentional tort action against the employer because he
presented issues of fact concerning vicarious liability. Rennier did not explicitly discuss
whether the statutory cause of action is cumulative or alternative, and ultimately the
issue will have to be resolved by the Louisiana Supreme Court.
2,, Johnson v. Chicago Mill & Lumber Co., 385 So. 2d 878 (La. Ct. App. 1980)
(employer knowingly left firewood piled in dangerous manner, and pile collapsed, kill-
ing worker; summary judgment for defendant) (emphasis added).
2,' E.g., Crenshaw v. Service Painting Co., 394 So. 2d 706 (La. Ct. App. 1981)
(employer knew that nearby sandblasting was causing sand to accumulate on scaffold,
but failed to remove the sand and replace missing grates, causing deceased to fall; sum-
mary judgment for defendant); Guidry v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 359 So. 2d 637 (La.
Ct. App. 1978), cert. denied, 362 So. 2d 578 (La. 1978) (employer left sharp, pointed
knife on shelf, facing outward, injuring employee's eye; complaint dismissed).
26 Bazley v. Tortorich, 397 So. 2d 475, 481 (La. 1981) (complaint by worker
against co-employee alleging only negligence failed to state cause of action). The court
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It remains to be seen how broadly the Louisiana courts will construe
the above-quoted test of constructive intent. One intermediate appellate
court has held that a widow stated a cause of action by proving that the
defendant ordered her husband, a maintenance supervisor, to be a se-
curity guard during a violent labor dispute." '7 Another court allowed
the plaintiff to amend his complaint to allege that his employer knew
that the business of manufacturing phenolic resin produced an excessive
amount of highly volatile dust, knew that the machinery in the plant
had become so worn that it produced sparks caused by friction, and
therefore knew that a fire and explosion causing physical injury to the
plaintiff were substantially certain to result."1 8 On the other hand, the
courts have dismissed complaints alleging that an employer knew of
dangerous working conditions "' or intentionally violated safety regula-
tions.22 Therefore, it appears that the Louisiana courts will adopt a
liberal test of constructive intent, but will not permit actions for
recklessness. 2 '
Louisiana has set a useful precedent by authorizing an alternative
cause of action based upon proof of either deliberate or constructive
intent. There has been a disturbing tendency to pattern the statutes
creating alternative causes of action after the legislation authorizing cu-
mulative causes of action,2 even though the actions are in fact very
different. Cumulative causes of action provide compensatory and puni-
explicitly rejected the restrictive test of intent which had been applied by the intermedi-
ate appellate courts. Id. at 482. The court also refused to define "intentional act" to
encompass "gross negligence" because, before the Louisiana Legislature passed the
amendment to the exclusive remedy statute, the legislature had rejected "broader penal-
ties that would have provided double benefits for an employer's violation of a safety
rule, failure to provide a safety device required by law, or gross negligence on the part
of the supervisory employee . . . ." Id. at 480.
", Hurst v. Massey, 411 So. 2d 622 (La. Ct. App.'1982).
22 Mayer v. Blue Cross Ins. Co., 402 So. 2d 273 (La. Ct. App. 1981).
229 McDonald v. Boh Bros. Constr. Co., 397 So. 2d 846 (La. Ct. App. 1981).
220 Cortez v. Hooker Chem. & Plastics Corp., 402 So. 2d 249 (La. Ct. App. 1981).
221 Brown v. P.S. & Sons Painting, Inc., 680 F.2d 1111 (5th Cir. 1982) (applying
Louisiana law) (employer knew that he had purchased inferior pipe for scaffolding, but
did not know that it would break, injuring plaintiff); Jacobsen v. Southeast Distrib.,
Inc., 413 So. 2d 995 (La. Ct. App. 1982) (employer who refused to supply safety
equipment to painter on swinging stage knew that an accident was "reasonably proba-
ble," but not "substantially certain"); Reed v. Yor-Wil, Inc., 406 So. 2d 236 (La. Ct.
App. 1981) (complaint alleging that employer knew or should have known that actions
would cause injury to employee failed to state cause of action). Compare text accompa-
nying notes 150-58 supra.
222 Compare statute quoted in text accompanying note 139 supra with statute quoted
in text accompanying note 192 supra.
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tive damages in addition to workers' compensation benefits, and it may
be appropriate to confine them to cases of more glaring employer mis-
conduct. Alternative causes of action, on the other hand, are filed in
lieu of workers' compensation benefits. If a highly restrictive test of
intent is adopted, most injured employees will select workers' compen-
sation benefits, rather than risk a failure to establish "deliberate inten-
tion."2 ' Consequently, the "deliberate intention" test undermines the
punitive and deterrent potential of the alternative tort cause of action.
b. Judicially Created Cause of Action
Although only seven state legislatures have explicitly sanctioned an
alternative tort cause of action,224 many courts have independently au-
thorized injured workers to sue their employers in lieu of receiving
workers' compensation benefits.2" 5 These judicially created exceptions to
the standard exclusive remedy provisions closely parallel the language
of the statutes discussed above. 226 The vast majority of courts adhere to
the "deliberate intention" test of the defendant's state of mind. 7 In the
223 The majority of courts have treated the employee's election as an election between
two valid but inconsistent remedies. 2A A. LARSON, THE LAW OF WORKMEN'S COM-
PENSATION § 67.31 (1982). In these jurisdictions, an unsuccessful damage suit does not
bar a compensation claim. Id. Nevertheless, it substantially delays the filing of the
claim and receipt of benefits.
22, See text accompanying notes 192-96 supra.
225 E.g., Griffin v. George's, Inc., 267 Ark. 91, 589 S.W.2d 24 (1979); Duncan v.
Perry Packing Co., 162 Kan. 79, 174 P.2d 78 (1946); Bock v. Wong Hing, 180 Minn.
470, 231 N.W. 233 (1930); Great Western Sugar Co. v. District Ct., 610 P.2d 717
(Mont. 1980); De Coigne v. Ludlum Steel Co., 251 A.D. 662, 297 N.Y.S. 636 (1937);
Blankenship v. Cincinnati Milacron Chems., Inc., 69 Ohio St. 2d 608, 433 N.E.2d 572
(1982); Middleton v. Texas Power & Light Co., 108 Tex. 96, 185 S.W. 556 (1916)
(injury, not death); Kittell v. Vermont Weatherboard, Inc., 138 Vt. 439, 417 A.2d 926
(1980).
226 See text accompanying notes 192, 213 supra.
227 E.g., Houston v. Bechtel Assocs. Prof. Corp., 522 F. Supp. 1094, 1096 (D.D.C.
1981) (construing Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act); In re
Johns-Manville Asbestosis Cases, 511 F. Supp. 1229 (N.D. Ill. 1981); Griffin v.
George's, Inc., 267 Ark. 91, 96, 589 S.W.2d 24, 27.(1979); Boek v. Wong Hing, 180
Minn. 470, 471, 231 N.W. 233, 234 (1930); Great Western Sugar Co. v. District Ct.,
610 P.2d 717, 720 (Mont. 1980); Kennecott Copper Corp. v. Reyes, 75 Nev. 212, 215,
337 P.2d 624, 626 (1959); Wilkinson v. Achber, 101 N.H. 7, 10, 131 A.2d 51, 54
(1957); Santiago v. Brill Monfort Co., 10 N.Y.2d 718, 176 N.E.2d 835, 219 N.Y.S.2d
266 (1961); Readinger v. Gottschall, 201 Pa. Super. 134, 137, 191 A.2d 694, 696
(1963); Kittell v. Vermont Weatherboard, Inc., 138 Vt. 439, 441, 417 A.2d 926, 927
(1980). Contra Jones v. State, 33 N.Y.2d 275, 279, 307 N.E.2d 236, 237, 352
N.Y.S.2d 169, 171 (1973) (allegation of "intentional assault" states cause of action);
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alternative, they require proof of "actual intent to injure," an equally
stringent standard."2 Very few courts have adopted the Restatement of
Torts'22 definition of intent,23 and they have unanimously rejected ac-
tions based on wanton or reckless misconduct."' As a result, plaintiffs
have successfully stated a cause of action only by alleging that the de-
fendant-employer deliberately struck, " shot,'33 or poisoned' the plain-
tiff, or intentionally and fraudulently exposed the plaintiff to asbestos
fibers235 or toxic chemical fumes. 36
Finch v. Swingly, 42 A.D.2d 1035, 1035, 348 N.Y.S.2d 266, 268 (1973) (plaintiff must
allege "intentional or deliberate act" by defendant).
228 Gallegos v. Chastain, 95 N.M. 551, 624 P.2d 60 (1981); Schlenck v. Aerial Con-
tractors, Inc., 268 N.W.2d 466, 471 (N.D. 1978).
22- RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 8A (1965).
230 In re Johns-Manville Asbestosis Cases, 511 F. Supp. 1229, 1233-34 (N.D. Ill.
1981); Duncan v. Perry Packing Co., 162 Kan. 79, 86, 174 P.2d 78, 83 (1946); Blank-
enship v. Cincinnati Milacron Chems., Inc., 69 Ohio St. 2d 608, 433 N.E.2d 572, 581
(1982) (concurring opinion); Reed Tool Co. v. Copelin, 610 S.W.2d 736, 739 (Tex.
1980) (action by worker's spouse for loss of consortium); Bryan v. Utah Int'l, 533 P.2d
892, 894-95 (Utah 1975).
2,, Love v. Flour Mills of Am., 647 F.2d 1058, 1060 (10th Cir. 1981) (applying
Oklahoma law); Houston v. Bechtel Assocs. Prof. Corp., 522 F. Supp. 1094, 1097
(D.D.C. 1981) (construing Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act);
Tysenn v. Johns-Manville Corp., 517 F. Supp. 1290, 1293 (E.D. Pa. 1981); Ulichy v.
National Dust Collector Corp., 391 F. Supp. 1265, 1268 (E.D. Pa. 1975); Hagger v.
Wortz Biscuit Co., 210 Ark. 318, 324, 196 S.W.2d 1, 4 (1946); Duncan v. Perry Pack-
ing Co., 162 Kan. 79, 86, 174 P.2d 78, 83 (1946) (see dissenting opinion for argument
that recklessness action should be allowed); Great Western Sugar Co. v. District Ct.,
610 P.2d 717, 720 (Mont. 1980); Kennecott Copper Corp. v. Reyes, 75 Nev. 212, 216,
337 P.2d 624, 626 (1959); Santiago v. Brill Monfort Co., 10 N.Y.2d 718, 176 N.E.2d
835, 219 N.Y.S.2d 266 (1961); Ross v. State, 8 A.D.2d 902, 903, 187 N.Y.S.2d 13, 14-
15 (1959); Cooper v. Queen, 586 S.W.2d 830, 833 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1979); Kittell v.
Vermont Weatherboard, Inc., 138 Vt. 439, 441, 417 A.2d 926, 927 (1980).
2 Barnes v. Chrysler Corp., 65 F. Supp. 806 (N.D. Ill. 1946); Heskett v. Fisher
Laundry & Cleaners Co., 217 Ark. 350, 220 S.W.2d 28 (1950); Boek v. Wong Hing,
180 Minn. 470, 231 N.W. 233 (1930); Le Pochat v. Pendleton, 187 Misc. 296, 63
N.Y.S.2d 313 (Sup. Ct. 1946), af'd, 271 A.D. 964, 68 N.Y.S.2d 594 (1947); Lavin v.
Goldberg Bldg. Material Corp., 274 A.D. 690, 87, N.Y.S.2d 90, appeal denied, 275
A.D. 865, 89 N.Y.S.2d 523 (1949); Garcia v. Gusmack Restaurant Corp., 150
N.Y.S.2d 232 (Sup. Ct. 1954); Readinger v. Gottschall, 201 Pa. Super. 134, 191 A.2d
694 (1963).
233 Jones v. State, 33 N.Y.2d 275, 307 N.E.2d 236, 352 N.Y.S.2d 169 (1973).
234 De Coigne v. Ludlum Steel Co., 251 A.D. 662, 297 N.Y.S. 636 (1937).
23. Neal v. Carey Canadian Mines, Ltd., 548 F. Supp. 357, 378-81 (E.D. Pa. 1982);
In re Johns-Manville Asbestosis Cases, 511 F. Supp. 1229 (N.D. I11. 1981); McDaniel
v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 487 F. Supp. 714 (N.D. I11. 1978).
236 Blankenship v. Cincinnati Milacron Chems., Inc., 69 Ohio St. 2d 608, 433
N.E.2d 572 (1982).
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The limited scope of these judicially created causes of action can best
be understood by examining their development. Legislatures passed
broadly worded exclusive remedy statutes,2" and courts were faced with
the unenviable task of circumventing these provisions on some princi-
pled basis. Consequently, judges articulated carefully circumscribed
theories which allowed injured workers to institute tort proceedings
outside the scope of the workers' compensation act.'
The first technique used to establish a judicial exception to the exclu-
sive remedy clause was finding that the commission of an intentional
tort severed the employment relationship.2" ' Cases adopting this ap-
proach have permitted employees who were struck maliciously by their
employers to recover damages in a battery action."" Courts utilizing
this technique insist upon proof of deliberate intention on the theory
that only specific intent to injure is sufficiently egregious to effectuate
the fictional severance of the employment relationship."' The advan-
tage of this method is that it gives the employee the option of 1) treat-
ing the relationship as still in existence and claiming workers' compen-
sation benefits, or 2) considering the relationship as terminated and
seeking common law tort remedies."' The disadvantage of this method
is that it is purely fictional. The employment relationship may in fact
continue long after the tort judgment has been finalized.
The most commonly used techniques for creating judicial exceptions
focus on the language of the standard exclusive remedy clause.4 3 The
courts find either that the employee's injury was not "accidental"' or
that it did not "arise out of the employment relationship."2 5 Courts
using-the "accidental" approach4 6 acknowledge that the term may en-
237 See note 98 supra.
238 See generally 2A A. LARSON, THE LAW OF WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION § 68.11
(1982).
23 Bock v. Wong Hing, 180 Minn. 470, 231 N.W. 233 (1930).
240 Heskett v. Fisher Laundry & Cleaners Co., 217 Ark. 350, 230 S.W.2d 28 (1950).
21 Griffin v. George's, Inc., 267 Ark. 91, 589 S.W.2d 24 (1979).
2 Boek v. Wng Hing, 180 Minn. 470, 231 N.W. 233 (1930).
The election is not irrevocable. An injured worker may file a tort action and then
decide to claim workers' compensation benefits instead. E.g., Owens v. Bill & Tony's
Liquor Store, 258 Ark. 887, 529 S.W.2d 354 (1975).
213 See text accompanying notes 95-99 supra.
244 E.g., Le Pochat v. Pendleton, 187 Misc. 296, 63 N.Y.S.2d 313 (Sup. Ct. 1946),
afl'd, 271 A.D. 964, 68 N.Y.S.2d 594 (1947).
2,. E.g., Blankenship v. Cincinnati Milacron Chems., Inc., 69 Ohio St. 2d 608, 433
N.E.2d 572, 576 (1982).
248 E.g., Arrington v. Michigan-Wisconsin Pipe-Line Co., 632 F.2d 867 (10th Cir.
1980) (applying Oklahoma law); In re Johns-Manville Asbestosis Cases, 511 F. Supp.
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compass any injury that is "unexpected or unintended" from the em-
ployee's point of view,247 thereby maximizing the scope of workers'
compensation coverage. However, if the complaint alleges that the em-
ployer acted with deliberate intent to bring about the consequences of
the act248 or, in some jurisdictions, with constructive intent, 49 then the
misconduct ceases to be accidental.250 One court5 described the policy
justification for this approach in the following terms: "It would be ab-
horrent to our sense of justice to hold that an employer may assault his
employee and then compel the injured workman to accept the meagre
allowance provided by the Workmen's Compensation Law." '252
The other method of creating a judicial exception to the standard
exclusive remedy clause is finding that the employer's misconduct did
not arise out of the employment relationship. The employee is permit-
ted to bring an intentional tort action on the theory that only "ordinary
risks of employment" arise out of employment.5 While negligent con-
duct is deemed to be an expected hazard, no reasonable individual
would contemplate the risk of an intentional tort as a natural risk of
employment. 24 Therefore, intentional misconduct does not "arise out of
employment," and the plaintiff may pursue common law tort reme-
1229 (N.D. Ill. 1981); Rosales v. Verson Allsteel Press Co., 41 111. App. 3d 787, 354
N.E.2d 553 (1976); Duncan v. Perry Packing Co., 162 Kan. 79, 174 P.2d 78 (1946);
Kennecott Copper Corp. v. Reyes, 75 Nev. 212, 337 P.2d 624 (1959); Daniels v. Swof-
ford, 55 N.C. App. 555, 286 S.E.2d 582 (1982); Readinger v. Gottschall, 201 Pa.
Super. 134, 191 A.2d 694 (1963); Cooper v. Queen, 586 S.W.2d 830 (Tenn. Ct. App.
1979).
247 Arrington v. Michigan-Wisconsin Pipe-Line Co., 632 F.2d 867 (10th Cir. 1980)
(applying Oklahoma law); Daniels v. Swofford, 55 N.C. App. 555, 286 S.E.2d 582
(1982). See also text accompanying notes 47-56 supra.
248 E.g., Duncan v. Perry Packing Co., 162 Kan. 79, 174 P.2d 78 (1946).
249 E.g., Finch v. Swingly, 42 A.D.2d 1035, 348 N.Y.S.2d 266 (1973).
250 E.g., De Coigne v. Ludlum Steel Co., 251 A.D. 662, 297 N.Y.S. 636 (1937); Le
Pochat v. Pendleton, 187 Misc. 296, 63 N.Y.S.2d 313 (Sup. Ct. 1946), affld, 271 A.D.
964, 68 N.Y.S.2d 594 (1947).
251 Lavin v. Goldberg Bldg. Material Corp., 274 A.D. 690, 87 N.Y.S.2d 90 (1949),
appeal denied, 275 A.D. 865, 89 N.Y.S.2d 523 (1949).
252 Id. at 693-94, 87 N.Y.S.2d at 93-94.
253 E.g., Busick v. Workmen's Comp. Appeals Bd., 7 Cal. 3d 967, 500 P.2d 1386,
104 Cal. Rptr. 42 (1972); Blankenship v. Cincinnati Milacron Chems., Inc., 69 Ohio
St. 2d 608, 433 N.E.2d 572 (1982). See also Barnes v. Chrysler Corp., 65 F. Supp.
806, 807 (N.D. I11. 1946). For an excellent discussion of this theory, see Duncan v.
Perry Packing Co., 162 Kan. 79, 85-86, 174 P.2d 78, 87 (1946).
254 Blankenship v. Cincinnati Milacron Chems., Inc., 69 Ohio St. 2d 608, 433
N.E.2d 572, 576 (1982).
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dies.5 The problem with this technique is that it rests on the artificial
assumption that only "ordinary" risks arise out of employment. Never-
theless, it encourages courts to think about policy considerations when
determining which risks are covered by workers' compensation legisla-
tion. In addition, this approach can be used in jurisdictions that include
occupational diseases within the scope of workers' compensation cover-
age by providing that benefits will be awarded for "any injury arising
out of employment," and not just for "accidental injury. 2 6
Courts have developed three different procedures to determine
whether an injury is "accidental" or "arises out of the employment re-
lationship." In some states, workers' compensation tribunals and the
courts are deemed to have concurrent subject matter jurisdiction over an
intentional tort action."" The employee is given an election between
workers' compensation benefits and tort damages through the technique
of estopping the defendant from objecting to the court's jurisdiction if
the employee chooses to sue in tort.2 ' The defendant is precluded from
asserting that the intentionally inflicted injury was caused "acciden-
tally" on the grounds that calling an intentional tort "accidental" is a
fiction which was developed solely to make injured workers eligible for
workers' compensation.5 9 It would be a "travesty of justice" to permit
the fiction to operate in favor of one whose act has been intentionally
harmful.260 Under the estoppel approach, as under the "severance of
employment relationship" theory, "6' the worker is given a genuine elec-
tion of remedies, and is thereby assured an opportunity to plead and
prove punitive damages.
However, most jurisdictions that recognize alternative causes of ac-
tion have not adopted the estoppel approach. Instead, they have treated
workers' compensation benefits and tort damages as mutually exclusive
and inconsistent remedies.2 6 Workers' compensation tribunals have ju-
255 Id.
16 For example, California's legislation provides that workers' compensation shall be
the exclusive remedy for "any injury sustained by ... [an employee] arising out of and
in the course of the employment." CAL. LAB. CODE § 3600 (West Supp. 1983).
257 Boek v. Wong Hing, 180 Minn. 470, 231 N.W. 233 (1930). See also Williams v.
Smith, 222 Tenn. 284, 435 S.W.2d 808 (1968) (action against co-employee).
251 Boek v. Wong Hing, 180 Minn. 470, 231 N.W. 233 (1930). At one time, the
New York courts applied this estoppel technique. E.g., De Coigne v. Ludlum Steel Co.,
251 A.D. 662, 297 N.Y.S. 636 (1937).
25. Williams v. Smith, 222 Tenn. 284, 292, 435 S.W.2d 808, 811 (1968). See text
accompanying notes 50-53 supra.
260 Williams v. Smith, 222 Tenn. 284, 291, 435 S.W.2d 808, 811 (1968).
26' See text accompanying notes 239-42 infra.
262 E.g., Reep v. United States, 557 F.2d 204 (9th Cir. 1977); Harrington v. Moss,
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risdiction to award benefits for injuries that are accidental and arise out
of employment, while courts may award tort damages in other cases. In
some states, the workers' compensation tribunal is given exclusive or
primary jurisdiction to determine jurisdiction." 3 If there are questions
of fact (for example, about whether the injury was accidental) the
workers' compensation tribunal must resolve them before a court can
take jurisdiction over an intentional tort action. 64 In these jurisdictions,
the workers' compensation board determines the availability of compen-
satory and punitive damages. In other states, the courts have concurrent
jurisdiction with the workers' compensation board to determine subject
matter jurisdiction.2 61 In these jurisdictions, the first tribunal determines
whether the employee may claim compensatory and punitive damages,
and its judgment is res judicata in the other tribunal. 66 This approach
gives the plaintiff a choice of forum, but does not ensure that the plain-
tiff has an opportunity to proceed in tort.
In summary, the primary problem with the judicially authorized al-
ternative cause of action is finding a theory that both justifies its crea-
tion and provides a viable procedure for its implementation. The courts
that have allowed an intentional tort action only when the injury is not
"accidental" or does not "arise out of the employment relationship"
have been sensitive to legislative intent, as expressed in the exclusive
remedy statutes. However, these theories lead to the development of
mutually exclusive remedies, which are cumbersome to administer. The
fictional "severance of employment relationship" theory ignores the
language of the exclusive remedy provisions, but permits a genuine
choice of remedies comparable to that provided by the Arizona, Ken-
tucky and Maryland statutes.267 This evaluation suggests that legisla-
407 A.2d 658 (D.C. Ct. App. 1979); Scott v. Industrial Accident Comm'n, 46 Cal. 2d
76, 293 P.2d 18 (1956); Anderson v. Gailey, 97 Idaho 813, 555 P.2d 144 (1976);
Szydlowski v. General Motors Corp., 397 Mich. 356, 245 N.W.2d 26 (1976);
O'Rourke v. Long, 41 N.Y.2d 219, 359 N.E.2d 1347, 391 N.Y.S.2d 553 (1976).
"' Harrington v. Moss, 407 A.2d 658, 661 (D.C. Ct. App. 1979); Szydlowski v.
General Motors Corp., 397 Mich. 356, 245 N.W.2d 26 (1976). Similarly, in New
Zealand, the Accident Compensation Corporation has exclusive jurisdiction to deter-
mine whether the plaintiff has suffered personal injury by accident. See notes 18 and
47 supra.
264 Reep v. United States, 557 F.2d 204, 207 (9th Cir. 1977) (applying Federal Em-
ployees Compensation Act); Szydlowski v. General Motors Cqrp., 397 Mich. 356, 245
N.W.2d 26 (1976); Weber v. State, 104 Misc. 2d 947, 429 N.Y.S.2d 380 (Ct. Cl.
1980).
6' Scott v. Industrial Accident Comm'n, 46 Cal. 2d 76, 293 P.2d 18 (1956).
266 Anderson v. Gailey, 97 Idaho 813, 555 P.2d 144 (1976).
26 See text accompanying note 192 supra.
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tures would be well-advised to authorize alternative causes of action by
statute in those jurisdictions that have already recognized them judi-
cially, because legislators could establish clearly defined procedures that
would maximize the punitive and deterrent impact of tort damages.
C. Legislative Options
Various options for drafting pure no-fault legislation have emerged
from this comparative study of the right to recover punitive damages for
intentionally or recklessly inflicted injury in New Zealand and the
United States. A legislature preparing to enact a pure no-fault statute
must first decide whether, as a matter of policy, to preserve tort liability
for punitive damages. This is of course an issue on which reasonable
people may disagree. Although courts in New Zealand and the United
States have performed amazing feats of statutory construction in order
to retain punitive awards, " 8 some commentators advocate the abroga-
tion of punitive damages.' Assuming that the legislature decides to
retain the punitive award to punish and deter egregious misconduct,
there are two options for implementing its decision. One option would
authorize the recovery of punitive damages alone as an independent,
cumulative remedy. The other option would preserve tort liability for
both compensatory and punitive damages by authorizing either cumula-
tive or alternative tort actions for intentional or reckless acts.
1. Punitive Damages as a Cumulative Remedy
The development of punitive damages as a cumulative remedy has
been pioneered by New Zealand27° and Texas."' The cumulative rem-
edy option is attractive because it effectuates a sharp allocation of the
functions traditionally performed by tort actions: no-fault benefits are
awarded to compensate the injured person, and punitive damages are
available to deter and punish the wrongdoer. This approach also places
a definite ceiling on the wrongdoer's liability for compensatory dam-
268 See, e.g., text accompanying notes 40-78 supra.
269 E.g., D. HIRSCH & J. POUROS, THE CASE AGAINST PUNITIVE DAMAGES (DRI
Monograph 1969); Carsey, The Case Against Punitive Damages: An Annotated Out-
line, 11 FORUM 57 (1975); Ghiardi, The Case Against Punitive Damages, 8 FORUM
411 (1972). For a discussion of the arguments both for and against punitive damages,
see J. GHIARDI & J. KIRCHER, note 129 supra, §§ 2.01-.13; Mallor & Roberts, Puni-
tive Damages: Toward a Principled Approach, 31 HASTINGS L.J. 639 (1980); Morris,
Punitive Damages in Tort Cases, 44 HARV. L. REV. 1173 (1931); Note, In Defense of
Punitive Damages, 55 N.Y.U. L. REV. 303 (1980).
20 See text accompanying notes 40-90 supra.
2,, See text accompanying notes 110-28 supra.
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ages. However, because this option abrogates liability for compensatory
damages, it ought to be adopted only if the no-fault plan provides ade-
quate substitute benefits to the victims of intentional or reckless con-
duct. Otherwise, tort liability for compensatory damages should be
preserved.
The cumulative remedy has important procedural advantages. It will
reduce collateral litigation for two reasons. First, tort actions will be
brought solely to deter or punish outrageous misconduct, not to obtain
compensatory damages. Second, contribution actions between joint
tortfeasors will be prohibited in most jurisdictions because tort liability
will be imposed solely for punitive damages, which will be assessed
separately against each individual wrongdoer. The other attractive fea-
ture of the cumulative remedy is that it does not necessitate the continu-
ance of liability insurance. In fact, to maximize the punitive and deter-
rent impact of the cumulative remedy, it would be appropriate for the
legislature to prohibit liability insurance coverage of punitive damages
as a matter of public policy.
If the cumulative remedy approach is adopted, the legislature must
explicitly exempt punitive damages from the provision that substitutes
no-fault benefits for tort liability," and the legislature should also
specify the state of mind that will justify the imposition of punitive
damages. At a minimum, liability ought to be imposed for intentional
(including fraudulent) conduct. A jurisdiction wishing to maximize the
punitive and deterrent impact of the cumulative remedy could also im-
pose liability for recklessness (that is, the conscious disregard of the
safety or rights of others). To eliminate the potential problems caused
by the unavailability of compensatory damages, the legislature should
specify that punitive damages may be recovered upon proof of nominal
damages or upon proof that the plaintiff sustained actual harm covered
by the no-fault plan. The legislature could also direct the courts to as-
sess punitive damages commensurate with the nature of the defendant's
conduct and the value of the defendant's assets, thereby changing the
rule of some jurisdictions that punitive damages must be reasonably
related to the amount of compensatory damages recovered.
2. Cumulative or Alternative Tort Actions for Punitive Damages
Not every jurisdiction will want to restrict the liability of an inten-
tional or reckless wrongdoer to a punitive damages award, however.
Legislatures in these states may prefer to recognize either a cumula-
2I See text accompanying notes 91 and 110 supra.
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tive2" or an alternative27 ' tort action for compensatory as well as puni-
tive damages. There are several advantages to a cumulative cause of
action. First, it permits the injured person to obtain no-fault benefits,
and then to sue for compensatory tort damages if the no-fault benefits
do not adequately cover all the losses sustained. Second, it is easy to
administer cumulative claims for no-fault benefits and tort damages be-
cause they are consistent and may be processed simultaneously. Last,
the cumulative cause of action avoids line-drawing between the spheres
of no-fault coverage and tort liability. The legislature need only decide
whether to restrict cumulative liability to cases of deliberate intent,27 or
broaden liability to include intentional acts, or even recklessness.
Critics argue that the cumulative cause of action is too generous and
conflicts with the no-fault objective of limiting a defendant's tort liabil-
ity for compensatory damages. The alternative tort cause of action rep-
resents a more conservative approach, in which the defendant is sub-
jected to tort liability only when no benefits have been awarded under
the no-fault plan. A legislature that selects the alternative approach
may either give the injured person a genuine choice between two mutu-
ally exclusive remedies, " ' or force an election by specifying in advance
the circumstances under which each remedy will be available.277 Giving
the injured person a genuine choice is easier to administer, but conflicts
with the no-fault objective of limiting a defendant's liability for com-
pensatory damages.
Specifying the circumstances under Which each remedy will be avail-
able in advance raises two problems. First, it must be determined who
will draw the line between the. mutually. exclusive remedies. The no-
fault tribunal may be given exclusive jurisdiction, or the courts may
have concurrent jurisdiction to decide the issue of subject matter juris-
diction. Concurrent jurisdiction offers the plaintiff a choice of forum,
which may enhance the likelihood that the court will acquire subject
matter jurisdiction. Granting the no-fault tribunal exclusive jurisdic-
tion, on the other hand, provides a more streamlined procedure.
The second problem posed by the forced election approach is defin-
ing the line between tort liability and no-fault coverage. The most com-
monly articulated distinction is that between accidental and nonacciden-
tal injury. However, this distinction was originally developed to
273 See text accompanying notes 137-86 supra.
2" See text accompanying notes 187-267 supra.
27 See text accompanying note 139 supra.
278 See text accompanying note 192 supra.
277 See text accompanying note 213 supra.
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distinguish between industrial accidents, which were covered by work-
ers' compensation benefits, and occupational diseases, which were not.
If the purpose of permitting alternative tort liability is to punish and
deter egregious misconduct, it would be preferable to draw the line be-
tween tort liability and no-fault coverage with reference to the defen-
dant's state of mind. Thus, tort liability could be imposed either for
intentional acts..8 or for both intentional and reckless misconduct.
II. MODIFIED NO-FAULT PLANS
A. United States: No-Fault Automobile Insurance
The pure no-fault plans studied in the preceding section completely
eliminate tort liability and substitute no-fault benefits. Modified no-
fault plans represent a less drastic approach, affecting only tort liability
for noneconomic loss." 9 Under the modified no-fault plans enacted by
fifteen American jurisdictions, 8' victims of automobile accidents are
paid no-fault benefits for their economic losses (including medical ex-
penses and wage loss) up to a maximum amount, which ranges from
$2000 to over $85,000.281 In exchange, the victims give up their right to
sue for noneconomic loss, such as pain and suffering, 2 ' unless they
cross a "threshold" designed to prevent tort suits for noneconomic loss
in the absence of serious injury.283 Dollar thresholds establish an
278 Id.
279 See generally I. SCHERMER, note 7 supra, § 1.01.
280 COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 10-4-701 to -723 (1973 & Supp. 1981); CONN. GEN. STAT.
ANN. § 38-319 to -351a (West Supp. 1982); FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 627.730-.741 (West
1972 & Supp. 1982) (repealed in October, 1982, for legislative revision); GA. CODE
ANN. §§ 56-3401b to -3416b (1977 & Supp. 1982); HAWAII REV. STAT. §§ 294-1 to -
41 (1976 & Supp. 1981); KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 40-3101 to -3121 (1981); KY. REV.
STAT. ANN. §§ 304.39-010 to -340 (Baldwin 1981); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 90, §
34A-340 (West 1969 & Supp. 1982), ch. 231, § 6D (Supp. 1982); MICH. STAT. ANN.
§§ 24.13101-.13179 (Callaghan 1981); MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 65B.41-.71 (West Supp.
1982); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 39.6A-1 to -20 (West 1973 & Supp. 1982); N.Y. INS. LAW
§§ 670-678 (McKinney Supp. 1982); N.D. CENT. CODE 26-41-01 to -19 (1978 &
Supp. 1981); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 40, §§ 1009.101-.603 (Purdon Supp. 1982); UTAH
CODE ANN. §§ 31-41-1 to -13.4 (1953 & Supp. 1981).
2, For a table summarizing these statutes, see Note, No-Fault Automobile Insur-
ance: An Evaluative Survey, 30 RUTGERS L. REV. 910, 926 (1977). If the plaintiff's
economic losses are greater than the no-fault benefits, the plaintiff may recover the
difference in a tort action.
282 The statutory provisions abrogating tort liability for noneconomic loss are set
forth in I. SCHERMER, note 7 supra, § 10.01.
283 For a table summarizing the modified no-fault thresholds, see Note, No-Fault
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amount of medical expenses (usually $500 or $1000) which is deemed
to demonstrate that serious injury was sustained." '8 Verbal or narrative
thresholds define serious injury by reference to physical effects, such as
death, serious impairment of body function, or permanent serious
disfigurement." '2
This section examines whether modified no-fault plans have any im-
pact on an automobile accident victim's right to recover punitive dam-
ages in tort. The answer depends on the language of the no-fault stat-
ute, and there is considerable diversity in the wording of the fifteen
American no-fault plans."8 6 Nevertheless, two basic issues can be identi-
fied. First, are punitive damages a noneconomic loss (as the term is
defined by the no-fault statute), thereby requiring the plaintiff to prove
serious injury in order to obtain a punitive award? Second, if punitive
damages are a noneconomic loss, does the no-fault plan cover inten-
tional tort and recklessness actions, or are they outside the scope of the
act?
Cases from three states have considered these issues. In Nales v.
State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co.,"' the plaintiff, who
had been struck by a drunk driver, sought punitive damages despite the
fact that he was unable to meet the narrative threshold specified in the
Florida no-fault law.2 " The statute provided that the defendant was
"exempted from tort liability for damages" unless the plaintiff met the
threshold requirements for "damages in tort for pain, suffering, mental
anguish and inconvenience because of bodily injury ...arising out of
the ownership, maintenance, operation or use of such motor vehicle." 8 "
The plaintiff argued that the statute made no reference whatsoever to
liability for punitive damages." ' The court agreed, and held that the
no-fault law should be strictly construed against the defendant because
it is a "statutory limitation on an injured party's common'law right of
action." 29'
The Nales court was then faced with the defendant's contention that
punitive damages were not recoverable unless supported by an underly-
Automobile Insurance: An Evaluative Survey, 30 RUTGERS L. REV. 910, 926 (1977).
" I. SCHERMER, note 7 supra, § 10.03.
2.1 Id. §§ 10.02, 10.04.
2I8 See statutes cited in note 280 supra.
287 398 So. 2d 455 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981).
2"- FLA. STAT. ANN. § 627.737(2) (West Supp. 1982) (repealed for revision).
289 Id.
290 Nales v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 398 So. 2d 455, 456 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1981).
291 Id.
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ing award of compensatory damages. 292 Adhering to the approach
adopted by the New Zealand judiciary,2" the court ruled that punitive
damages "need only bear some relationship to the fact of the injury
. . . and the cause thereof." ' Consequently, the plaintiff was permit-
ted to claim punitive damages based upon proof of the actual harm
which he had suffered, harm for which he could not obtain compensa-
tory damages because of the no-fault law's immunity. 95
In Georgia, a completely contrary result was reached in Teasley v.
Mathis.296 The plaintiff, who had been injured by a drunk driver,
sought exemplary damages in a recklessness action, but was unable to
meet the threshold requirement.29 The court held that the action was
barred by the no-fault statute,298 which provides that, in an action for
"bodily injury arising out of the operation" of a motor vehicle, "an
insured person shall be exempt from liability to pay damages for
noneconomic loss unless the injury is a serious injury," as defined by
the threshold requirement.299 The statute defines "noneconomic loss" as
"pain, suffering, inconvenience and other nonpecuniary damage recov-
erable under the tort law of this State,"3' and the Georgia Supreme
Court ruled that exemplary damages are a "noneconomic loss. ''3°O Fur-
thermore, it held the statute constitutional because "one of the purposes
of the Act is to do away with collateral litigation in order to effect
prompt payments."3"2 Had the Georgia Supreme Court strictly con-
strued the statutory limitations on common law rights of action," 3 it
might have reached a different result. "Pain," "suffering," and "incon-
venience" are various types of compensatory damages, and therefore the
court could have ruled that "other nonpecuniary damage" refers exclu-
sively to other items of compensatory damage, thereby exempting puni-
tive damages from the threshold requirement.
Given the Teasley court's holding, however, it is important to ex-
22 Id. at 457. For a discussion of this issue in the context of pure no-fault legisla-
tion, see text accompanying notes 86-90, 122-28, and 129-30 supra.
2,. See text accompanying notes 86-90 supra.
294 Nales v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 398 So. 2d 455, 457 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1981).
295 Id.
294 243 Ga. 561, 255 S.E.2d 57 (1979).
29, GA. CODE ANN. §§ 56-3402b(13), 56-3410b (1982).
298 Teasley v. Mathis, 243 Ga. 561, 564, 255 S.E.2d 57, 59 (1979).
299 GA. CODE ANN. § 56-3410b (1982).
o1 GA. CODE ANN. § 56-3402b(1) (1982).
'' Teasley v. Mathis, 243 Ga. 561, 563, 255 S.E.2d 57, 58 (1979).
302 Id.
303 See text accompanying note 291 supra.
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amine Georgia's statutory definition of exemplary damages: "In a tort
action in which there are aggravating circumstances, in either the act or
the intention, the jury may give additional damages to deter the wrong-
doer from repeating the trespass or as compensation for the wounded
feelings of the plaintiff." 0' This is not a definition of punitive damages,
as that term is normally used in the United States. 05 Rather, it is a
definition of aggravated damages, as that term is defined in New Zea-
land.3 1 6 Therefore, it was quite appropriate for the Teasley court to
classify "exemplary damages" as a type of "nonpecuniary loss," since
exemplary damages are primarily compensatory in nature. However, if
this is a correct interpretation of the court's decision, the case will have
a very limited impact outside Georgia because, in most jurisdictions, the
primary function of punitive damages is not to compensate, but to
punish.
In the third case, Reimer v. Delisio,30 a Pennsylvania court "reluc-
tantly"30 8 denied punitive damages to a plaintiff who had brought a
recklessness action against a speeding motorist. The Pennsylvania no-
fault statute states: "Tort liability is abolished with respect to any in-
jury that takes place in this State . . . if such injury arises out of the
maintenance and use of a motor vehicle, except that . . . [an] individ-
ual remains liable for intentionally injuring . . . another individual.""3 '
The Reimer court ruled that recklessness is not included within the
exemption for intentional torts. 10 The court then examined another ex-
ception in the statute, which preserves tort liability for noneconomic
loss, provided the plaintiff meets the threshold requirements.3" ' The
plaintiff's injuries were sufficiently serious to cross the threshold, but
nevertheless the court denied her claim for punitive damages" ' because
the statute defines "noneconomic detriment" as "pain, suffering, incon-
venience, physical impairment, and other nonpecuniary damage,"' 13
304 GA. CODE ANN. § 105-2002 (Supp. 1982).
303 See generally D. DOBBS, note 106 supra, § 3.9.
306 See text accompanying notes 58-62 supra.
307 296 Pa. Super. 205, 442 A.2d 731 (1982).
30o Id. at 209, 442 A.2d at 733.
30 PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 40, § 1009.301(a)(3) (Purdon Supp. 1982).
3 " Reimer v. Delisio, 296 Pa. Super. 205, 215, 442 A.2d 731, 736 (1982).
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 40, § 1009.301(a) (5) (Purdon Supp. 1982).
Reimer v. Delisio, 296 Pa. Super. 205, 217, 442 A.2d 731, 737 (1982). Accord
Teagle v. Hart, 279 Pa. Super. 487, 421 A.2d 304 (1980). Pennsylvania courts permit
the recovery of punitive damages under the no-fault statute when the plaintiff proves
an intentional tort. E.g., Karpecik v. Houck, 11 Pa. D. & C.3d 622 (C.P. Bucks
County 1979).
"I PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 40, § 1009.103 (Purdon Supp. 1982).
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and then explicitly provides that "the term does not include punitive or
exemplary damages."' 3 4 The court concluded that the legislature must
have intended to abolish recklessness liability for punitive damages
altogether." 5
The Pennsylvania no-fault law is perplexing until one examines its
legislative history. The statute is based on the National No-Fault Mo-
tor Vehicle Insurance Act, which recommended the abolition of puni-
tive damages in recklessness actions" 6 because they are often insura-
ble, 37 and insurance reduces the punitive and deterrent impact of
punitive damages. The drafters of the National Act authorized the cre-
ation of a noninsurable "tort fine" to replace punitive damages in reck-
lessness actions."' Pennsylvania's no-fault law preserves liability for
"nonreimbursable tort fines."3 9 However, Pennsylvania has not yet
created a tort fine that can be imposed on reckless wrongdoers. To ful-
fill the intention of the drafters of the National Act, Pennsylvania
should either revise its no-fault statute to permit the recovery of nonin-
surable punitive damages, or pass legislation creating a tort fine for
reckless misconduct.
B. Legislative Options
Modified no-fault legislation that preserves the punitive and deter-
rent functions of tort liability is needed. A legislature drafting a modi-
fied no-fault plan has three options. First, it can include all tort actions
within the plan and establish a threshold requirement as a condition to
314 Id.
3 Reimer v. Delisio, 296 Pa. Super. 205, 215, 442 A.2d 731, 736 (1982). Contra
Tcheou v. Weimer, 13 Pa. D. & C.3d 243 (C.P. Dauphin County 1980).
", Reimer v. Delisio, 296 Pa. Super. 205, 212-15, 442 A.2d 731, 734-36 (1982).
For a discussion of liability insurance coverage of punitive damages in reckless-
ness actions arising out of automobile accidents, see J. GHIARDI & J. KIRCHER, note
129 supra, § 7.06. For a collection of cases authorizing punitive damages in automobile
accident cases, see Annot., 65 A.L.R.3d 656 (1975); Annot., 62 A.L.R.2d 813 (1958).
" Reimer v. Delisio, 296 Pa. Super. 205, 212-16, 442 A.2d 731, 734-36 (1982).
,9 PA. STAT. ANN. tit 40, § 1009.301(b) (Purdon Supp. 1982). The statute provides:
Nothing in this section shall be construed to immunize an individual
from liability to pay a fine on the basis of fault in any proceeding based
upon any act or omission arising out of the maintenance or use of a motor
vehicle: Provided, that such fine may not be paid or reimbursed by an
insurer or other restoration obligor.
Id. The court in Reimer rejected the plaintiff's "valiant" argument that the term "tort
fine" includes punitive and exemplary damages. Reimer v. Delisio, 296 Pa. Super. 205,
211-15, 442 A.2d 731, 734-36 (1982).
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recovering punitive damages. 2 This option will substantially curb col-
lateral litigation, and will confine the recovery of punitive damages to
cases of serious injury. However, this approach is based on an assump-
tion that punitive damages are warranted only when the plaintiff has
been seriously harmed. In fact, punitive damages are awarded to pun-
ish and deter egregious misconduct, and there is no necessary correla-
tion between the nature of the defendant's conduct and the seriousness
of the plaintiff's injuries.
The second option available to the legislature is the recognition of
punitive damages as an independent, cumulative remedy. 2' Under this
approach, all tort actions are brought within the no-fault plan, but pu-
nitive damages are excluded. As a result, punitive damages may be re-
covered without satisfying the threshold requirement. The legislature
should specify the state of mind that will justify the imposition of puni-
tive damages. For automobile accidents, it may be desirable to impose
punitive liability for recklessness322 (particularly in cases of drunk driv-
ing)323 as well as for the commission of intentional torts. Consideration
should also be given to prohibiting liability insurance coverage of puni-
tive damages.
The third option is to preserve tort liability for both compensatory
and punitive damages in cases of intentional or reckless conduct. 2 Al-
though it is possible to create a cumulative cause of action,32 legisla-
320 See text accompanying notes 296-303 supra.
", See text accompanying notes 287-95 supra. Hawaii has explicitly recognized a
cumulative punitive remedy in its no-fault legislation:
No provision of this section shall be construed to exonerate, or in any
manner to limit the criminal or civil liability of any person who, in the
maintenance, operation, or use of any motor vehicle:
(1) Intentionally causes injury or damage to a person or property; or
(3) Engages in conduct resulting in punitive or exemplary damages.
HAWAII REV. STAT. § 294-6 (Supp. 1982).
.22 See Annot., 62 A.L.R.2d 813 (1958). For a discussion of the type of recklessness
that will subject defendants to liability for punitive damages, see text accompanying
notes 150-59 supra. Drafters of no-fault legislation may wish to draw upon the pro-
posed statutory tests for recovering punitive damages in products liability actions. S.
2631, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. § 13 (1982) ("'[Reckless disregard' means conduct mani-
festing a conscious, flagrant indifference to the safety of those persons who might be
harmed by a product and constituting an extreme departure from accepted practice.");
MODEL UNIF. PROD. LIAB. ACT § 120, 44 Fed. Reg. 62714, 62748 (1979).
323 See J. GHIARDI & J. KIRCHER, note 129 supra, § 5.03; Annot., 65 A.L.R.3d 656
(1975).
32 See text accompanying note 309 supra.
32. A cumulative intentional tort action would permit a plaintiff to sue in tort for any
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tures in the United States have chosen instead to develop an alternative
cause of action. " 6 Under this approach, negligence actions come within
the scope of no-fault legislation, and intentional tort or recklessness ac-
tions fall outside it. If this option is selected, it will be crucial to include
a precise definition of the state of mind that removes the action from
the scope of the no-fault act.3"7
CONCLUSION
The basic philosophy behind the enactment of pure and modified no-
fault plans is that the negligence lottery should be replaced with a sys-
tem that compensates plaintiffs promptly and without proof of fault for
their economic losses. The impetus for the adoption of no-fault legisla-
tion came from the failure of negligence law to compensate accident
victims fairly and efficiently. However, in developing no-fault legisla-
tion, broad exclusive remedy provisions have been enacted which
threaten to eliminate not only negligence liability, but tort liability for
intentional and reckless conduct as well. It has been the thesis of this
Article that no-fault legislation should be viewed as a substitute for
compensatory damages only, and that tort liability for punitive damages
should be preserved to punish and deter wrongdoers. Support for this
proposition can be found in the case law construing no-fault legislation
in both the United States and New Zealand. This Article has examined
that body of case law and has suggested various options for drafting no-
fault legislation that will both compensate accident victims and preserve
the punitive and deterrent functions of tort law.
economic or noneconomic loss for which the plaintiff had not received no-fault benefits.
,2, See text accompanying note 309 supra.
,' For the text of the Uniform Motor Vehicle Accident Reparations Act and the
intentional tort exclusionary provisions that have been enacted in the United States, see
I. SCHERMER, note 7 supra, § 6.02. For a discussion of statutory definitions of reckless-
ness, see note 322 supra.
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